TWO NATIVE STATES

BEING LETTERS FROM

HYDERABAD AND MYSORE

BY

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LETTERS

FROM

HYDERABAD.

I.

HYDERABAD and its affairs have lately occupied a considerable amount of public attention, and the different accounts one reads are so contradictory that it is almost impossible to reconcile them except on the supposition that the parties publishing them are interested either in praising or in crying down the Government. Mr. Gorst after spending some time in Hyderabad and being hospitably entertained, has not hesitated to take up the parable against the Native States in the pages of the *Fortnightly*. The *Times* correspondent at Calcutta goes so far as to telegraph home that not only is the present Minister on bad terms with the British Resident,

but that he is also disloyal at heart to the British Raj. Other newspaper correspondents follow suit. On the other hand some newspapers, especially those of Bombay, are lavish, perhaps a little bit too much so, in their praises of everything that goes on. It is difficult to come across a really impartial critic, or at all events, one who conveys the impression of being impartial. Now all this is very bewildering and misleading, because whilst on the one hand the administration is far from perfect, on the other, the present Government is by no means responsible for a state of things which it has inherited and which it professes, and I believe honestly professes, to be anxious to reform. I have lately had occasion to spend some weeks in Hyderabad, and having met many of the higher officials on terms of intimacy, have had good opportunities of seeing something of their inner official and social life. What I have seen and heard I now wish to reproduce; and I shall endeavour to be impartial, awarding equally praise and blame.

It must never be forgotten that thirty years ago the Hyderabad State was on the verge of insolvency. For a hundred years and more, until after the close of the Pindarry war, it had been one constant battlefield. During this time

everybody had got out of the Nizam what he could. Tracts of land were assigned to this man or to that in payment of claims rightly or wrongly put forward, or as the emolument of military adventurers. Nor can it be said that the British failed to get a considerable profit out of their 'Faithful Ally.' The districts which were ceded after the peace of 1799 now bring in nearly 70 lakhs of rupees, and were assigned in payment of the subsidiary force which we are bound by treaty to maintain. The pecuniary profit on this transaction has been considerable. The Berars, which are said to form the fairest portion of the Nizam's Dominions, have since been ceded in order to provide for the payment of the contingent which the Nizam has bound himself to maintain. It is true that we hand over the surplus to the Nizam, and that the districts have greatly prospered under our rule, but it is also true that our administration of the Berars is far more costly than that of provinces where the cost comes entirely out of our own pockets. In the same way that *we* did not hesitate to make a good thing for ourselves, there were hundreds of others who did the same. There was however this difference. Whereas we gave a *quid pro quo* in the shape of peace and good

government, they gave nothing at all. Like the vampires of the middle ages they simply sucked out the heart's blood of the State. Thirty years ago the late Sir Salar Jung found the greater part of all that was worth having in the hands of men who claimed to hold it on a military tenure, which was no longer required. The majority of these held their lands on conditions which they no longer fulfilled, whilst others had under them large bodies of followers who scarcely professed allegiance to any one except the chiefs who paid them. The civil government of the country was in a state of the utmost disorder. The revenues were farmed out to persons who never even visited the districts they were supposed to administer. The districts were therefore let and sub-let and the ultimate victim was the ryot. Anything like systematic government was unknown. All was done in what is known as *moglae* fashion. Now the word *moglae* is one that like the name of Byron's Corsair, is

> "Linked with one virtue and a thousand crimes."

The virtues, however, were chiefly confined to the social public intercourse of the nobles, the crimes were perpetrated on the ryots. Amongst the nobles there was a show of courtesy and chivalrous feeling which found

vent in ostentation and profusion. In order to uphold his honour and dignity the noble shrank from no sacrifice, but the chief sufferer in the end was the ryot. Profusion and extravagance necessitated borrowing, and borrowing brought on rack-renting and mortgages, until at last the creditor looked only to the ryot to recoup himself for his capital and usurious interest. The result may be imagined. When Sir Salar Jung first commenced his government, the country was fast becoming depopulated. Tracts of country which a couple of hundred years ago must have been amongst the most thickly populated and highly cultivated in Central India had become jungles. In one district alone, where formerly was the capital of the richest of the Hindu kingdoms—Worangal—there are no less than 250 square miles of country taken up by works of irrigation. The greater part of the irrigable area, however, has been allowed to degenerate into jungle, and there are now thick forests where there ought to be fields of rice. From one vast lake, covering 24 square miles, an average revenue of only Rs. 18,000 is obtained. As for systematic government such a thing was unknown. In fact it was very often difficult to know who was the responsible executive officer, for it

sometimes occurred that two, three, or even half a dozen persons held the same appointment. I extract the following from Mr. Cheragh Ali's interesting book on *Hyderabad under Sir Salar Jung*.

"Up to this time, with the exception of the restored districts, the Divani territory was divided into talukas, but this division of administrative authority did not correspond with the territorial divisions of the country. Thus, whilst the number of talukas of the Divani territory was fixed and definite, the number of talukdars was indefinite and uncertain, and liable to increase or diminution every year. In the year 1268 Fasli (A.D. 1858) there were 61 talukdars, whilst later in 1274 (A.D. 1864) the number was reduced to about 40, the number of talukas remaining the same. Some talukdars held only a few villages, whilst others held a number of talukas."

The revenue which some had to collect amounted to as much as 9 lakhs, whereas others had to collect only 2,000 Rupees. Of course, where the land farmers were grasping the officials were also corrupt and played as much as possible into their hands. This was the state of things against which Sir Salar Jung had to struggle. From the time of Sir Salar Jung it may be said that in Hyderabad there have been two active principles at work: the spirit of progress and reform represented by that distinguished statesman, and the *moglae* or conservative spirit which has striven to keep

things in their old groove. When we regard the confusion in which Sir Salar Jung found everything, and the difficulties he had to contend with, difficulties which in an Eastern country are far greater than they are in Europe, and when we consider how many persons there were whose interests were diametrically opposed to anything like reform, it becomes almost marvellous what great changes he was able to effect. The land revenue increased from 75 lakhs in 1853 to 165 lakhs in 1881; a vast number of jaghirs, the holders of which had no proper titles, or who had no longer any services to render, were resumed; a regularly organised system of civil administration was introduced throughout the country; a survey and settlement was commenced which at the time I write has completed its operations in the Mahratta districts which form nearly one half of the whole dominions; a regular police force was organized, and a judicial system, which though not yet perfect, brought justice within the reach of all. These are only a few of the chief reforms inaugurated, and space will not allow me to go further into detail. Now one of the charges brought by Mr. Gorst against Sir Salar Jung is that from interested motives he neglected to employ natives of Hyderabad in positions of trust, and introduced foreigners

from the Punjab, the North West, and Bombay, whom he pitch-forked into the highest appointments. The answer to this objection is very easy even supposing it to be true, which it is not. Let any candid minded person say whether it would be possible for changes of the kind I have narrated to be introduced without the assistance of men acquainted with what was wanted? Is it likely that the old corrupt officials would have been willing or capable of introducing purity into the administration? Was a *moglae* officer of the old stamp likely to change his skin and commence work in systematic routine? Was an old-fashioned Talukdar the man likely to conduct a system of scientific survey? Of course these reforms could not be introduced without competent men, and such men it was necessary to import from elsewhere. How far the reproach made by Mr. Gorst is deserved is shown by the memorandum lately published by the present Minister of the progress which has taken place during the first six months of his government. From this paper we gather that from the Secretary to Government down to the Tahsildars, there are in the Revenue Department altogether 267 officials, of whom 144 are Hyderabadees, 59 Hindustanees, 20 Madrasees,

33 from Bombay, and 2 from other parts of India! The wonder is that so much could be done without employing more foreigners, and Mr. Gorst's assertion that almost all the Revenue Officers are Mahomedans who have been brought by Sir Salar Jung from various parts of India, and especially from the N. W. Provinces, falls entirely to the ground. I do not wish to be supposed to imply that everything is perfect. Far from it; there still remains a great deal to be done, but I do claim that the progress made during the last 30 years has been wonderful, and the more wonderful when we consider the materials that were available. What the condition of things now is, and what still remains to be done, I must reserve for future letters.

II.

The quotation which Salar Jung made use of the other day, on occasion of the meeting held at Hyderabad in honour of Lord Ripon was a very happy one:—"Trust me in all or not at all." It must be confessed that Lord Lytton's policy was the very opposite of this. Even the late Sir Salar Jung was not thoroughly trusted, and for several years a man was placed by his

side, who was not only the representative of principles diametrically opposed to those of that great statesman, but who was also his avowed personal enemy. At the Delhi assemblage, Lord Lytton's manner was cold in the extreme, and Sir Salar Jung was given the cold shoulder in a manner that must have been extremely irritating to him. It was only after Lord Ripon's arrival that a policy of confidence was commenced. The obnoxious Co-Regent died; and Sir Salar Jung for nearly three years was made the sole Regent. During this short time the reforms which had been contemplated were energetically carried on. The new survey and settlement was pushed on under the able direction of Moolavie Syed Mahadi Ali (now known as Nawab Muneer Nawaz Jung); a Board of Revenue was appointed; the judicial system was reformed, and many other administrative changes were either made or contemplated. Then occurred Sir Salar Jung's death, and for a year there was an interregnum. Lord Ripon was apprehensive of making Sir Salar Jung's son sole Minister on account of his youth, (he was then only just over 20) and the Peishcar, Raja Narendra was appointed senior administrator with young Salar Jung as his colleague. This experiment proved a failure,

and though the Peishcar is the man whom Mr. Gorst would like to see appointed as Minister it is clear from his own description of him in the April number of the *Fortnightly*, that he was not fitted for the post. Raja Narendra is an old man, he is infirm, and, as Mr. Grattan Geary (*Hyderabad Politics*) informs us, is addicted to the use of opium. So infirm is he, that when I saw him the other day at a public meeting, it was only with difficulty that he could rise from his chair and support himself by leaning on a table. Even Mr. Gorst, (who, Mr. Geary more than insinuates, received Rs. 82,000 as the fee for his advocacy,) is obliged to admit that the Peishcar was "eccentric in his mode of conducting business. He carried his documents of State about with him in his pockets, and gave audiences at midnight in a cellar." This, however, was not all. During the year of interregnum things were allowed to slide into their old *moglae* groove. The Peishcar assumed to himself the whole of the authority, and his colleague was never consulted; appointments were made by back-stair influence; the legally constituted heads of departments were not consulted, and large sums of money were paid away from the treasury which have never since been satisfactorily accounted for. I state here only plain

facts, every one of which can be proved by official documents and by overwhelming evidence. Before the year of interregnum was over all those who were enlisted on the side of reform were in despair. The experiment was a failure. Lord Ripon convinced himself of the truth of this, and then wisely resolved when installing the Nizam to use no half measures. He invested the young Prince with full powers and refused to interfere with his nomination of Sir Salar Jung's son as Minister. Since then there as been no sign of a withdrawal of that confidence. There has been a cordial interchange of opinions between the Minister and the Resident, important events have occurred which required prompt and energetic action, and the last utterances of Lord Ripon were to reiterate the trust which he placed in the Nizam and his Minister. It was this trust and confidence which called forth so many expressions of loyalty and affection, not only towards Lord Ripon personally, but towards the British Government. As regards Lord Ripon's policy in India two very contradictory statements are being constantly made. The one is that he has done more than any other Viceroy or Governor-General to excite race hatred, and the other is that he has done more than any

one else to draw the peoples of India towards the British Government. Contradictory as these statements are, there is some truth in both. The irritation which has been excited is no doubt genuine but it is chiefly felt by the representatives of traditions which are rapidly passing out of date. The Ilbert Bill caused soreness of feeling on both sides which by nature of the controversy became exaggerated far beyond what the question called for. That soreness existed—for I believe it no longer exists, or only in a very slight degree,—principally between the representatives of the different factions. Hard blows were dealt on both sides during the heat of the battle, but the general mass of the people were more or less indifferent. But there can be no doubt on the other hand that the tendency of Lord Ripon's policy has been to excite an amount of enthusiasm and loyalty which has never before been displayed, and it may therefore be said with some truth that British rule as represented by the late Viceroy was never more popular among natives than it is at the present moment. This is the feeling in Hyderabad. Lord Lytton's policy was somewhat of a nagging one and therefore irritating; Lord Ripon's was one of confidence and therefore popular.

Another of Mr. Gorst's charges against both the Nizam and the young Minister is that they are both steeped in the excesses of the harem, and therefore incapacitated for work. Charges of this kind are very easily made, but are most difficult to refute. There are certain low minds who take a pleasure in besmirching the names of persons in high position. There is not a crowned head or an exalted statesman in Europe of whom similar stories have not been told. It is therefore probable that strangers reading such accusations will accept them *cum grano salis*, while to those who know more of the persons accused it will be at once plain how unfounded they are. The present Salar Jung is a man of magnificent build and physique, he is a keen sportsman, a splendid shot, a good billiard and lawn tennis player; qualities which one would scarcely look for in a man enervated by the zenana. His very appearance at once belies the charge; his form is robust and his face healthy and open. As regards the Nizam, Mr. Grattan Geary points out that one of his first acts was to remove from the zenana and to occupy a separate house with the mother of his young child. Only recently, when the races took place, he was suffering from a severe attack of fever,

but he never failed once in his attendance, even although he had to be carried in a chair to the top of the pavilion. As regards the work done by the Minister I will give an instance of my own personal experience. One day I was taken over the office of the Revenue Secretariat, and the system of work was explained to me by the Revenue Secretary himself, Nawab Muneer Nawaz Jung, or, as he is better known to some, Mahadi Ali. I was much struck by the systematic way in which everything was arranged. No *moglae* fashion here. A board against the wall showed which departments the writers at work belonged to, and only a few minutes was required to get all the references and papers on any given subject. Receipt and despatch books, registers and indexes were all kept up to date, and everything was managed as it is in a first class Government Office. On our return to Mahadi Ali's room there was a despatch box on the table. "This box" said my friend "has just come back from the Minister, it contains the papers which I sent to him yesterday for orders. You shall now see, if you like, how he does his work." The box was opened by the duplicate key kept by the Revenue Secretary and contained some twenty bundles of papers, each bundle being of greater or less bulk. In

each case the Minister's order had been recorded by his own hand, and, though generally speaking he agreed with the recommendation of the Secretary, his order showed that he had studied all the papers himself. In one or two cases he differed and asked for further information. Two orders struck me particularly as having nothing of the *moglae* about them. A member of the Minister's own personal staff had written a letter signed by himself but conveying the impression that it was written by authority. In this letter a request was made that a certain appointment should be given to a certain person. Thereupon the Secretary had written a memorandum to the Minister, stating that he presumed this letter had been written under orders but he wished to point out that the request was an improper one. The patronage belonged to a different department, and it would be a most evil precedent if appointments were to be made in this manner. The Minister in his endorsement thanked the Secretary for bringing this irregularity to his notice. He said that the letter had been written without his knowledge or authority; that the appointment should not be made, and that the member of his staff should be informed that if he ever again transgressed in a similar way his ser-

vices would be dispensed with. The other instance was that of an official, a personal friend of the Minister, who was going on two or three months leave, and who asked that as an exceptional case he might receive an advance of pay. The answer was curt,—on no account were the standing orders to be broken. Now these may be small things but like straws they show how the wind blows. "Each Head of a Department," said my friend Mahadi Ali, "sends up a similar box every day, and no order except those of a routine nature is ever passed without having been first submitted to the Minister." Now, as there are some seven or eight departments, and the boxes are regularly sent back the day after receipt, it may be imagined that the Minister's work is something considerable. This, however, leads to the subject of departments, and as there are here some *moglae* customs which I think might be changed with advantage, I shall reserve my remarks for another letter.

III.

I concluded my last letter by saying that the matter of departments opens out a question in which reform is needed. At present there are a number of heads of departments, seven I believe, all of whom do their work directly under the Minister's orders. Many of the heads of departments are nobles, who hold the posts more from hereditary right than from personal qualifications. The only connecting link between all these departments is the Minister himself, who, therefore, besides being the administrative and executive head of the State, becomes, as it were, a chief secretary. Unless the whole thread of government routine is maintained in his office, there is no continuity whatsoever. The Minister may conscientiously go through every paper which is sent up to him from each department for orders, but as he sends the papers back to the department from which they came, it is quite possible, especially as new offices are being continually created, and old ones amalgamated, that an old question may crop up again and he may not know to which department to refer for former papers. This of course helps to keep up *moglae* practices and

customs which it would be well to do away with. The late Sir Salar Jung contemplated appointing a general or chief secretary, to whose department all others should be subordinate. His death prevented this idea from being carried through. The want of such an officer is now keenly felt, and especially so, because the present Minister, having been only a few months in office, has not the vast experience of what has happened that his father had. The various threads have been broken off, and it must take some time before he can join them together again. But here arises at once a difficulty. The chief secretary of a State like Hyderabad must be a man whose qualifications do not only consist of birth and wealth, but he must also be a man of considerable official experience, and of thorough practical knowledge of office routine. Qualities of this kind are only to be found in a man who has passed through the various ranks, and has gained his knowledge by practical experience. But, as *moglae* nobles consider it beneath their dignity to accept a subordinate post, and as each one expects to begin at the top of the ladder, the men possessing these qualifications are not so much men who are qualified by birth, as men who have risen by hard work; and pride of

birth and of wealth will prevent noblemen from obeying the orders of, or serving under such men. *Moglae* nobles have not yet learnt to distinguish between official and social rank, and many a year must elapse, and many a tradition be broken through, before the descendant of a Shumseru-d-Dowlah or a Koorshed Jáh will deem it an honour to learn official work under a Hyderabad Gladstone or Disraeli. I am far from saying that noblemen by birth should not occupy official posts; on the contrary I hold it to be the principal way in which they can serve their country, and that, if qualified, they will probably perform the duties of those posts better than men of obscure birth. But they must qualify; and to do that they must begin low down and rise by their own talents. Here therefore is a reform which is urgently needed, but one which can scarcely be carried out until the nobles themselves appreciate the circumstances of the case. In the meantime a step is about to be made in this direction by the appointment of a general secretary, who will not have authority over other departments, but through whom the orders to and from other departments will pass, thus creating as it were, a junction station at which the trains from the various side lines will meet and then pass on to

the terminus. This will at all events supply the link in the chain of continuity which is now wanting.

The present system of internal administration was organized entirely by Sir Salar Jung. When, as a young man of 23, he assumed office in 1853, the country was in a state of anarchy. The finances of the State were in a condition bordering on insolvency, a subject to which I shall allude further on. Immense tracts of land had been alienated, or were held by creditors. The Government lands which remained were let out to contractors, and as the Government was in almost daily embarrassment for money, offices were openly sold to the highest bidder. There were sometimes three or even four taluqdars of the same district, and so often did one officer succeed another, that it passed into a proverb that a contractor who went out to administer a new district, rode with his face to his horse's tail in order to see whether his successor was not following him. The noblemen to whom these districts were assigned by the State resided in Hyderabad and sub-let their districts to others who paid them in cash. These sub-farmers had one sole thought, and that was how most speedily to recoup the money they had laid out and make

a handsome profit into the bargain. Their exactions were endless, and as their authority was supported by bodies of irregular troops, they could without difficulty work out their wicked will. Bribery and corruption were the natural order of things, and the only way for the poor man to obtain peace was by payment. These contractors also exercised judicial powers, and if an unfortunate ryot ventured to dispute their exactions he was at once arrested and kept in confinement. It was at this time that Sir Salar Jung was appointed minister. There was a debt due to the British Government of about fifty lakhs of rupees. There was a constantly occurring deficit, and on every side the State was besieged by creditors clamouring for money. To such a pass had things come that the State jewels had been pawned and sent to England. It was at this crisis that the Nizam was compelled to consent to the cession of the Berars in payment of the contingent he kept up. Regarding the rights and the wrongs of this treaty there is a great deal to be said, but it will be better to reserve what I have to say until I come to treat of the Hyderabad army. But whatever the justice or the injustice of the cession may have been, there can be no doubt that the effect of the treaty was the salvation

of the State. The annual cost of the contingent had reached nearly forty lakhs. The whole of the State revenue did not then exceed sixty-five lakhs, and the balance left was quite insufficient to meet the ordinary expenses of the administration. The consequence was a continual state of borrowing, and as the credit of the State was at the very lowest ebb an enormous rate of interest had to be paid. Relieved from the burden of having every month to pay a large sum for the contingent, the young minister was able to devote his whole energies to the internal reforms so much needed, and it is probable that he would have been less successful in extricating the State from the hands of the money lenders if he had been still saddled with the payment of the contingent. His first act was to abolish the system of contractors and to institute a rigid enquiry into the titles of all those who held lands belonging to Government. Strict economy was introduced at home and every nerve was strained towards improving the financial condition of the country. The result was very soon apparent. Relieved from the exactions of the contractors the ryots began to cultivate more land, and as the revenue had no longer to pass through the hands of a host of middle-men, but

was paid direct to the Government it at once began to increase. Of course reforms such as these could not be carried out at once, but before ten years was over the income of the State had more than doubled itself, and in twenty years had reached a figure nearly three times as high as that at which it had stood in 1853. The expenditure no longer exceeded the income, and not only had all the claims against the Government been satisfied, but the State jewels had also been redeemed. With administrative results such as these to show, who will venture to deny that India is capable of producing great statesmen and administrators? All that they want is an opportunity.

The district machinery in the Hyderabad territory is not unlike that in force in British Provinces. There are sixteen districts differing in size, but having an average of between four and five thousand square miles each. These districts are divided into groups of four, and each such division is administered by a Soobahdar, or officer corresponding to our Commissioner. Over each district is a Talukdar, an official like the British Collector, whose assistants are called second, third, and fourth Talukdars. In each taluq again is a Tahsildar, whose office requires no explanation. It has

lately been frequently urged by the native press and by deputations, that in British Provinces the judicial and revenue functions should be separated. It is however noteworthy that in this the largest Native State in India, these two functions are even more closely combined than in this or in other Presidencies. Here the Collector is certainly also a Magistrate but his powers are limited and the Civil Courts are entirely independent of his influence, whilst in each District there is a Judge holding supreme authority in both civil and criminal matters. In Hyderabad, however, both civil and criminal powers are exercised by the District officials, and except in the Supreme Courts in the city there are no separate judicial officers throughout the State. This is a matter in which reform would seem to be needed, but no change could be carried out without incurring very large expenditure, and it is doubtful whether the funds of the State would admit of this cost. There is one great difference between the working of the law Courts in Hyderabad and in British territory, and that is that in the Native State the administration of justice is not self-supporting. Sir Salar Jung's policy was to make justice as cheap to the people as possible. There is a stamp act, but its provisions are very

limited and a very large number of people are exempted from all liability under it. It is certainly a matter for argument whether in our British Courts justice is not made too expensive, and I believe that the late Sir Salar Jung used to dwell with some complacency upon the difference that existed in the cost of litigation in the Courts of his province as opposed to those in our territory. It seems to me however that reform might be made in Hyderabad without running into the opposite extreme.

In the first place it is only right that justice should be made as cheap as possible to the poorer classes, but I can see no reason why wealthy nobles should be allowed to claim exemption from paying fees and costs which they are well able to afford. If a stamp act could be introduced, which, while putting a check on unnecessary litigation, at the same time laid no burden on the poor, and also compelled the rich to pay a fair sum for the justice they seek, it might be possible to introduce a system of independent civil courts which would be no additional burden to the State. At present some of the wealthy noblemen take advantage of the exemption which they enjoy by levying stamp duties in their own jaghirs and thus derive a revenue from a source which legiti-

mately belongs to the Government of the State to which they are subject. In this matter of exemptions and privileges, however, we at once touch a dangerous subject and one which with all his tact and wisdom Sir Salar Jung was never able to dispose of effectually. But although so many great changes have been made, it cannot be said that the administration was perfect. Bribery and corruption, common to all countries, and especially to India, was openly tolerated in Hyderabad up to a later date than in most other Indian Provinces. It is not now openly practised, but the tradition of it still exists, and in the remoter parts of the State, where the officials are less liable to supervision, there is little doubt that many a transaction takes place which would not bear the light of day. Not only are many of the officials corrupt, but a large number are grossly ignorant, and the difficulty is to get Natives of the State who are properly qualified. Many a thing is still done in a slipshod *moglae* fashion as the following incident will show. An elaborate statement was shown to me of figures relating to imports and exports and noticing some startling discrepancies I asked what the reason of these great fluctuations was. The head of the department put his spectacles on his nose,

pondered for some time and then answered, "God only knows!" They are however doing their best to obtain a better class of officials, and the recent foundation of a Mahomedan College is a step in the right direction. But Mahomedans form only a small minority of the population, and an impetus to education is required not only in the capital but all over the State. It would be of advantage if scholarships could be founded in each of the district centres which would enable young men to come up the Capital and go through a course of study. It is the expressed intention of the Government to employ as many Natives of the State as possible, but some time must elapse before there will be a sufficient number of qualified men.

The Nizam's dominions are at present suffering under a disadvantage not dissimilar to what existed in France previous to the German war of 1870-71. Up to that period Paris represented, or pretended to represent, the voice of France. In the same way now the voice of Hyderabad is supposed to represent the voice of the Deccan; that is to say, the only articulate voice from the Deccan comes from Hyderabad. The city, the largest and the wealthiest of any Native State, full of rich nobles and opulent merchants, forms the centre

of interest. We read of Hyderabad politics and Hyderabad intrigues, but we hear very little of the nine and a half millions of people who make the Hyderabad State so important. The Hyderabad dominions fall naturally into three divisions. When the Mahomedans first invaded this ancient Hindu kingdom, they destroyed the capital, Worungal, and left the country round, which at one time must have been a highly cultivated centre of Hindu civilization, a desert. The Hindus fled south and established a new kingdom at Vizianagar. This part of the country having been desolated, there was peace. A new Musulman kingdom was founded at Golconda and a struggle then ensued between that capital and the western kingdoms of Ahmednagar and Dowletabad. Then came the Mahrattas. The old Hindu districts, the so-called Telingana country, were quiet, because depopulated, and the only danger was from the west. In the end the Mahrattas were subdued, but the trouble that they gave caused most attention to be attracted to that part of the country. That attention has continued to the present day, and because the western districts of the dominion gave the most trouble they have received the most care. There are more European stations in the Mahratta districts

than in the Telingana; it was there that the new survey settlement was first commenced; it is this portion of the country that has been most opened out by railways, and the consequence is that from these districts the State derives its surest income, whilst the ryots are at the same time in good circumstances. The second division of the Hyderabad State consists of the Berars. These districts, which form the garden of the country, are at present under our administration. The administration is not a cheap one when compared with that of British districts, but in spite of that the revenues have more than doubled since it came under our care. This is a fact upon which we pride ourselves, and we are apt to point to the Berars and say, referring to their former condition, Look upon this picture and upon that! We are, however, liable to forget that the revenue from this garden which we assumed, has not increased in anything like so great a proportion as that of the remainder of the State under the management of Sir Salar Jung. We took over the best part of the dominion, which had been less ravaged by war than any other; this portion we have undoubtedly improved, but we left to the Nizam a heterogeneous mass of which he had to make the best he could. We left him good, bad and

indifferent, and the result is that he has increased his revenue nearly three-fold, while we in the Berars have little more than doubled it. Considering the difficulties that Sir Salar Jung had to contend against, and the various circumstances he had to deal with, this is not a bad argument in favour of his rule. But all this increased prosperity has been principally derived from the Western or Mahratta Districts, upon which, as I have said most care has been bestowed. The third division of the State, the old Hindu or Telingana country, is still far behind-hand. It is covered with works of irrigation, the waters of which are but slightly utilized. It is comparatively speaking a jungle because owing to depopulation it has become overgrown. Nearly three hundred years ago the growth of this part of the country was checked, and since then its condition has retrograded. Its resources still remain undeveloped, and it is almost impossible to overestimate what those resources are. It contains the largest coalfield in this country. Its mineral wealth is undoubtedly great, and there are tanks and reservoirs, among the largest in the whole of India, which show how highly the country must once have been cultivated, but which are now comparatively speaking of little use to any

one, for the irrigable lands are jungles, and the country which should be teeming with people, is now for nine months in the year a haunt of fever. Deduct this part of the country and compare the progress of the remainder of the dominions with that of the Berars, and the comparison will be even more favourable to Sir Salar Jung's administration. But there is still a great deal to be done.

IV.

The burden which weighs down the Hyderabad State is the enormous cost of her military forces. In order to understand why it is that the expenditure under this head is so heavy, it will be necessary to give a slight restrospect of the military history of the State since we entered into alliance with it. When, at the close of the last century, French influence in the Dominion was finally broken, and just before the breaking out of our last struggle with Tippoo, a treaty of offence and defence was formed with Hyderabad. In the wars of the previous thirty years the old undisciplined armies of the State had been found untrustworthy and had been gradually replaced by regiments drilled and officered by Frenchmen. When the French power was broken it

became necessary not only to replace these forces by men as well drilled and disciplined, but also to provide a force sufficiently strong to defend the State from the neighbouring Mahrattas, and to protect the Government from any internal rebellion or rising of the still powerful chieftains. Accordingly, we agreed to provide an army of "6,000 sepoys with fire-locks, with due proportion of field pieces" at a cost of Rs. 24,17,100 per annum. This force was to be "at all times ready to execute services of importance such as the protection of the person of His Highness, his heirs and successors from race to race, and overawing and chastising all rebels or exciters of disturbance in the Dominions of the State, but it is not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor like Sebundy, to be stationed in the country to collect the revenues thereof" (Art. 5, Treaty of 1798). Another of the provisions of this treaty was that all territory conquered by the combined British and Hyderabad armies was to be equally divided between the two allies. The money required for the payment of this force was to be furnished by the Nizam, but in all other respects the army was exactly on the same footing as a British army. This was the origin of the Subsidiary Force, which some persons are in the habit of confounding with the Contingent

It was this Subsidiary Force which co-operated with us in the final capture of Seringapatam, and when the conquered territory came to be divided between the allies, the portion which fell to the share of the Nizam consisted of what now forms the greater part of the so-called Ceded Districts; *viz.*, Bellary, Cuddapah, and a portion of the present Kurnool district.

At the time when the partition took place, (A.D. 1800) the pay of the Subsidiary Force had fallen into arrears and in order to avoid the possibility of this again occurring, the Nizâm agreed to cede in perpetuity the above mentioned districts, in consideration of which we undertook the responsibility of all future maintenance of the Subsidiary Force, the numbers of which, it was provided, should be increased by two battalions of sepoys and one regiment of cavalry with a due proportion of guns and artillerymen, or a total of 8,000 firelocks, one thousand horse, and the requisite complement of guns. The districts thus permanently ceded were valued in the schedule attached to this treaty at Rs. 18,80,652, and had this valuation been a correct one, the bargain would have been by no means a bad one for the Nizam, since he would have secured the services of a thoroughly disciplined army and of an ally bound to defend

him against all enemies, at no cost to his State. As a matter of fact, however, it was soon found that the revenue derived from the Ceded Districts had been greatly undervalued. This undervaluation was due entirely to the years of anarchy and misrule which had preceded the fall of Mysore, during which the district and village officials had plundered the country and had falsified the accounts. Under the able management of Major (afterwards Sir Thomas) Munro, the revenues of these districts rapidly increased, and in a few years time they brought in double the amount at which they had been valued when the cession took place. The treaty of 1800 however provided that neither party should have any claim against the other in the event, either of the revenues falling short of the estimated amount, or of a surplus above that amount being realized. As a matter of fact these districts now bring in a revenue to Government of about 60 lakhs of Rupees, and have done so for the last 50 years. It may be said that the increase is due solely to the better administration of British officers. There may be some truth in this, but when we see that, under native management, a similar increase has taken place in Hyderabad territory, it would scarcely be fair to lay too much stress

on this assertion. The improvement is due probably almost entirely to the years of peace that have succeeded the anarchy of the last century. Looked upon in this light, although the Subsidiary Force costs the Nizam nothing, it may be fairly said that in the arrangements made for the payment of that force we have made not only a territorial but a considerable pecuniary profit. From the date of this cession all power of interference with the Subsidiary Force passed away from the Nizam. It was stationed in the cantonments of Secunderabad and Trimulgherry within a few miles of his capital, and he therefore enjoyed the protection afforded by its presence, but beyond this he could do nothing, he could not employ the services of a single soldier, or issue an order to one of the officers. It was very soon discovered that a military force constituted under these conditions was not sufficient for the administration of the country. The greater part of the dominions were divided amongst chiefs and noblemen, some of whom claimed almost absolute independence. The ryots had just lived through a time when, in order to provide for its safety, every village had become a fortification. The people had learned by experience that they could hope for

no assistance from the Government, against the marauders with which the country was infested, and they therefore had to protect themselves. The country was throughout in a disturbed and lawless state. Revenue was paid only when the collecting authority was powerful enough to enforce payment, and little more than a spark was required to set whole districts in a blaze. Under the provisions of the treaty of 1798 the Subsidiary Force could not be employed on duties of this kind. There was then no Police and it therefore became necessary to organize a force to be employed especially in keeping the domestic peace of the State. At this time there were large numbers of soldiers kept in employ by the important chieftains who held extensive districts on military tenure. The number of these amounted to about 30,000 but although the estates had been granted in the first instance in order to provide a military force to defend the State, these soldiers had come to regard their chiefs as their sole masters, and as the chiefs were continually endeavouring to assert their rights and privileges independently of the State, these armed bodies, which had been intended for the defence of the State, were in reality its greatest source of danger. In organizing the new force that was required it was

vain to look for assistance from these men, indeed it was because so little reliance could be placed upon the loyalty of these native levies that the French, and afterwards ourselves, had found it necessary to form a separate army. Here no doubt a great mistake was committed, which afterwards led to the financial embarrassments of the State. As soon as the services of the native levies were no longer necessary, owing to the constitution of the Subsidiary Force, a thorough reorganization of the tenures under which the military chiefs held their estates should have taken place. These estates were held free of assessment on condition solely that a certain number of armed men should be sent into the field when required. These armed men being no longer necessary, a *peiscush* or tribute, should have been fixed on each estate. In the course of a few years the chieftains would then have dismissed their overgrown rabble armies, and the men themselves, employed in agriculture, would have helped to develope the resources of the State. This, however, was not the plan which was adopted, and the only other course left was to organize a fresh body of troops. In addition to the troops required to preserve the domestic peace of the State, the Nizam had also bound himself in the same

treaty (Art. 12) in the event of war breaking out between the allies and any other power, to join the Subsidiary Force with six thousand infantry and nine thousand horse of his own troops. There can be no doubt that when this treaty was drawn up it was not contemplated that the Nizam should do anything more than send the native levies, to maintain which the military jaghirs had been granted. The objections, however, to these troops have already been pointed out, and so to provide for the wants required above, and also to have an army more directly attached to the Nizam's person it was resolved to raise a new force. The nucleus of such a force existed in the shape of a small brigade known as 'Malcolm's Command' which had already taken a part in the capture of Seringapatam, where it fought under the orders of Arthur Wellesley. This brigade was accordingly increased, and was drilled, and for the greater part officered, by Englishmen, whose services the British Government placed for that purpose at the disposal of the Nizam. This small force, which, at that time and for many years afterwards, was known as the "Nizam's Army," took a share in the first Mahratta war of 1803 and after that underwent various changes, until in 1813 it was thoroughly

reorganized by the Resident, Mr. Russell, after which time it was for some years known as the "Russell Brigade." In 1814 the force consisted of four European (two non-commissioned) and 121 native officers, and 800 sepoys, and formed therefore only a very small portion of the Contingent which, under the treaty, the Hyderabad State was bound to send into the field, and the remainder was, if required, made up from the native levies. In 1816 the Russell Brigade was increased by the addition of 300 horse. In 1817 the force formed part of Sir John Malcolm's command and took part in the battle of Mahidpur. Very great care had been bestowed on its efficiency, for in the official report of this campaign it is stated that "no brigade in India was more highly disciplined, or more complete in its appointments, camp equipage and bazaars, than the Russell Brigade." In 1820 the Resident, Sir Charles Metcalfe, made still further changes in the force and threw it open to all officers of merit. During the next seven years considerable additions were made to the numbers, and reliefs were instituted between the stations of Elichpore, Hingoli, Aurungabad and Hyderabad. By this time the cost had also greatly increased until it amounted to more than 20

lakhs annually. It will be noticed that throughout this period, although drilled according to the European method, and officered for a great part by Englishmen, the little army was essentially the Nizam's army and represented a portion of the contingent, which in the event of war breaking out he was by treaty bound to send into the field to co-operate with us. For this reason it was often spoken of as "The Contingent" until at last it came to be known exclusively by that name.

In 1828 H. H. Nasir-u-Daula succeeded to the Musnud and very considerable changes were made in the internal administration of the country. During the previous ten years a number of English officers had been employed in civil posts and in the management of the districts, but the new Nizam resolved to dispense with their services. An offer was also made to him by the British Government to relieve him of the Contingent on payment of 20 lakhs a year, but this he flatly refused to agree to. "He took pride in the force," says Colonel Meadows Taylor "and the English Government now declared that it should not be disturbed but that its cost should be lessened by sundry reforms." There was no question, it will be seen, of its maintenance being obli-

gatory upon the Nizam, in fact the decision that "it should not be disturbed", implies the contrary. The reforms in the matter of cost resolved upon do not, however, seem to have been carried out, and instead of the expenditure being lessened it was gradually increased. Maharajah Chandoo Lall was then the Prime Minister and had been at the head of affairs since 1806. It was his steady and persistent support of all proposals regarding the improvement of the Contingent that gained him the good will of the British Government. It is to be feared that this was almost the only part of his administration which deserved gratitude. Everything else was sacrificed in order to meet the annually increasing demand for money to pay the Contingent. By 1837 the cost of the Contingent had risen to very nearly 40 lakhs annually and at this time the total revenue derived from the State lands was little more than 60 lakhs. It was to meet this demand for money that recourse was had to the farming out of districts alluded to in my last letter. Money was borrowed at exorbitant rates of interest, and *nuzzeranas* of a large amount were taken from the persons who succeeded in getting leases of districts. Everything was done to raise cash. But in spite of all these efforts

cash was not always forthcoming. In order to meet one of the provisions of the articles of war, so as to make the members of the force amenable to a Court-martial it had been found necessary to pay the Contingent from the Resident's treasury, which was then reimbursed for its outlay by the Nizam's minister. By degrees, however, as the cost of the Contingent increased, the instalments became less regular. The debt once commenced, went on increasing until at last after a few years of Nasir-ú-Daula's reign, it amounted to about fifty lakhs. In order to clear off this debt the Nizam at last agreed to forego the two lakhs of rupees which the British Government paid him for the cession of his rights in the so-called Northern Circars on the Eastern Coast. These rights had been ceded to us in the last century previous to the treaty of 1798. The debt being wiped off, the State again started clear, but it was only the old story over again. The instalments fell into arrears and the debt went on annually increasing until at last in 1850 it amounted to 74 lakhs of rupees. The cost of the Contingent, which was now entirely under our management had also gone on increasing, and in that year it amounted to 40 lakhs and the force consisted of 84 European Officers and 9,397 natives of all

ranks with cantonments in seven different places. During the next three years the relations between the British and the Hyderabad Government can scarcely be said to have been pleasant. On our side there was a continual request for a settlement, and on that of the native State an evasion of payment. Promises were made only to be broken, and on more than one occasion payments were made in bills which were subsequently returned dishonoured. At this time General Fraser was the Resident, and he seems to have been actuated by the sole wish of extricating the State from her embarrassments. With this end in view he advocated our taking up a more decided line as regards the internal management of the State. This, however, Lord Dalhousie would not listen to. He insisted that the State should meet the obligation she had contracted, but refused to give her any assistance towards doing so. In 1851 a demand was made for a cession of territory in liquidation of the debt, and this demand had the effect of convincing the Nizam that something must be done. Accordingly he strained every nerve and by drawing upon his own private resources, and by pawning the State jewels succeeded in paying off 40 lakhs of rupees. More than this, however, he could not do, and

having done so much matters remained *in statu quo*. Again the instalments began to fall into arrears and the balance against the State gradually crept up, until in 1852 it reached very nearly 50 lakhs. Lord Dalhousie determined to wait no longer. General Fraser went away on short leave in 1853 and Colonel Low was sent down to conclude a treaty which should have the effect of finally settling the long standing debt. During all this time that the debt had been growing, no attempt was made on our part to decrease the expenditure of the Contingent on account of which alone the debt had been incurred. Everything connected with that force was managed on a princely scale. Although numbering not more than about 9,500 men of all ranks, there were no less than three Brigadiers! Lord Dalhousie in his letters to General Fraser often writes sarcastically of "your three Brigadiers" but he never hints that any one of them should be reduced. In fact it would have been difficult to decide who was the person competent to reduce expenditure. We sanctioned appointments and supplied the men to fill them, and then sent the bill to the Nizam. "Nizzy pays" was a proverb in those days, and if he did not pay, we simply wrote the amount down to his debit and produced the

bill at the time of settlement. The Contingent, to all intents and purposes, had become an English army. Instead of the "6,000 sepoys with fire-locks" which under the treaty of 1798 the Nizam was bound to pay for at a cost (exorbitant even in those days) of 24 lakhs of rupees annually, he had now ceded territory, which, had he kept it, would have been yielding an income of from 50 to 60 lakhs, and was in addition being annually debited for a force (originally his own but now ours) at a cost of 40 lakhs of rupees. And in addition to this the Native State was still keeping up—by the military fiefs which it had formerly granted—an undisciplined army which represented very nearly 100 lakhs of revenue! And when we remember that at this time the actual gross revenue of the whole Dominion was not much more than 60 lakhs of rupees, it is not difficult to understand that the State was on the verge of insolvency. But who brought her there?

In 1853 the time for a final settlement had at last arrived. Colonel Low's orders were precise; and had the Nizam refused to sign the new treaty he was ready to march the troops at his disposal on Hyderabad, which troops by a strange irony of fate would have been the very men to maintain whom this debt

had been contracted. But the Nizam had no intention of resisting. All that he stipulated for was that the cession should not be a permanent one. There can be no doubt that Lord Dalhousie's desire was that the cession should be final and complete, but in Colonel Low's despatch it is clearly stated that the Nizam only consented to sign the treaty on condition that the cession should be a temporary one. It was accordingly agreed that the Berars and the Raichore Doab should be ceded to the British Government for the payment of the Contingent and that any surplus should go to the reduction of the debt. Annual accounts were to be submitted to the Hyderabad Government and the Nizam was still to remain the nominal head of the Ceded territory. The revenue of the districts thus given up was estimated at between 30 and 40 lakhs of rupees, but it was soon found that it had been greatly underestimated. A few weeks after this treaty had been signed, the Prime Minister died and was succeeded by his nephew, a young man of about twenty-four. This was the late Sir Salar Jung. I have shown how he was able enough to see that there was nothing to be gained by "crying over spilt milk" and that the only thing to be done was manfully to face the diffi-

culties and to endeavour to reform the abuses. I have also tried, briefly it is true, to show how he accomplished this task, and space will not allow me to go over the same ground again.

From the foregoing it will be seen that in course of time both the Subsidiary Force and the Contingent had passed from the Nizam's control, and had become to all intents and purposes, British armies. He was therefore left with only the native levies upon which so little reliance could be placed. Salar Jung did a great deal towards reducing the military fiefs, but large numbers still remained. In 1857 the mutiny broke out and the Contingent was sent to the front. The State itself was left almost entirely unprotected and, as the attitude of a number of the chiefs was open to suspicion, Salar Jung found it necessary to organize a fresh body of military to preserve order. This was the origin of the present Reformed troops. This body of men is drilled and commanded by European officers but is entirely under the orders of the Nizam. The present commandant, Major Nevill, has brought them to a very considerable state of efficiency, and they convey the impression of being a very smart body of men.

From the foregoing it will be understood how

enormous is the drain which the military expenditure makes upon the Hyderabad revenues. First of all there is the Subsidiary Force in payment of which the Ceded Districts valued then at Rs. 18,00,000, but which are now worth Rs. 60,00,000. Under the treaty of 1800 this force was fixed at 1,800 infantry and 1,000 cavalry, but the actual strength of the Subsidiary Force now stationed in Secunderabad and Trimulgherry falls very much short of that figure. Then comes the Contingent in payment of which the State has temporarily yielded territory which now brings in upwards of 70 lakhs of rupees. The actual cost of the Contingent is now about 30 lakhs, but as the administration of these districts is very costly the surplus that is credited to the Nizam is seldom more than ten lakhs. There can be no doubt that if the Berars were under native management the cost of the administration would be far less. Certainly it is only fair to add that the money has been well spent, and I believe there is no province in India where every department is on so complete and perfect a scale as in the Berars.

Then come the Reformed troops which consisted in 1883 of 5,000 men. In addition to this there are several regiments of Irregular

troops many of whom are little more than undisciplined rabble. Some are employed as guards, and many are little more than pensioners. The total number of Irregular troops is given at 2,700 and the cost of these and of the Reformed troops amounts to more than Rs. 60,00,000 annually. This however is not all. There still remain the immense jaghirs or military fiefs of the noblemen. It is very difficult to give the exact value and size of these fiefs, for scarcely any of them have been surveyed. As regards the number of retainers they maintain, it is impossible to give anything like an accurate statement. It has, however, been calculated that the value of these military fiefs is not less than 60 lakhs of rupees annually and that the number of armed men is not under 25,000. It may therefore be said with perfect truth that Hyderabad has to pay more than 170 lakhs of rupees on account of military expenditure or say £1,500,000.

The worst of it is that in spite of this enormous expenditure, there is not a man of all this large force that is available for the defence of India, should there by any chance be a war with any foreign power. It is doubtful whether it would be in conformity with the treaties of 1798 and 1800 to despatch both the Subsidiary

Force and the Contingent to the frontiers of India, but, however that may be, there can be no doubt that under present conditions it would not be considerd safe to do so, for a well disciplined force is necessary to keep in check the large body of armed men who at present are under little or no control. What would seem to be required is that there should be a thorough resettlement of the military fiefs. Leaving the Subsidiary Force out of the question it should be settled how large a force the State should be bound to maintain, and she should neither be expected nor allowed to keep anything in excess of that number. The irregular and jaghir troops are now no longer required. They are useless for all practical purposes of warfare and are a source of danger to the State and of embarrassment to the Empire. A new army corps consisting of the Contingent and the Reformed troops should be organized. This force should form a portion of the Imperial army and might be officered by Englishmen and by native noblemen. If the strength were fixed at 15,000 men, 10,000, would probably be available in the event of war, for now that a thorough system of police has been organized 5,000 men would be amply sufficient for all local purposes, always supposing that

the irregular and jaghir troops were disbanded. The disbandment of these troops is of course an absolute necessity. If such a course were adopted gradually and with liberality these men who are now a useless burden and expense to the State might be settled on small farms, and would be of material aid in bringing under cultivation some of the millions of acres which are now lying waste. Although the force as I have proposed would form part of the Imperial army it should be directly under the Nizam himself. He should stand in the same relation to his local *corps d'armée* as the King of Saxony does towards that portion of the German army which is raised in his dominions. The force during times of peace would be available for all purposes of military display and pomp, and in the event of a war might be sent to the front under the command of one of the Nizam's family, aided of course by an English General and officers. In this way the efficiency of the force would be made equal to that of the rest of the Imperial army; the Nizam would have a personal interest and pride in it, and would no longer think that it was necessary for his dignity to maintain a large undisciplined rabble fit neither for work nor for fighting. The payment of this army

should, under certain guarantees, be left to the Nizam, and then perhaps the dream of Sir Salar Jung might at last be realized and the Berars be restored. The guarantee for the payment of the army could easily be arranged. Although administered by the Nizam's government, the revenues of the Berars should be paid into the treasury of a Paymaster of the Forces to be stationed in Hyderabad and appointed by the Supreme Government, and the surplus remaining after the troops had been paid could by him be sent to the Nizam's treasury. By an arrangement such as this from 60 to 70 lakhs of rupees annually would be set free for the administration of the country.

V.

The great cost of her army has, as we have seen, been the primary cause of Hyderabad's embarrassments. Had she continued to maintain her native levies only, she would probably have been able to get along in a hap-hazard kind of fashion; but when, in addition to these, she also had to pay from thirty to forty lakhs annually for a small army disciplined according to the European style, it was burning the candle at both ends, and in 1853 she was, in con-

sequence, on the verge of insolvency. Then came the treaty under which the Berars and the Doab were ceded, and she was relieved from the cost of the Contingent. The vigorous and able administration of Sir Salar Jung introduced system and order into what had been confusion and chaos, and, as I have shown, the province improved from year to year until at last it was in a fair way to prosperity. Then came the mutiny of 1857. Every one knows what the attitude of Hyderabad was during that crisis, and how greatly Sir Salar Jung's loyalty strengthened our hands. In the same way as Sir John Lawrence kept the Punjaub, so did Sir Salar Jung keep the Deccan, in check. When the mutiny had been quelled there arose the question of reward, and it has often been asserted that, as far as Hyderabad was concerned, we were by no means ungrateful. This is what we did. First of all we restored the Raichore Doab which had been ceded in 1853. This, however, can scarcely be called an act of generosity, because the cession had been made in order to provide for the payment of the Contingent, and it was found that the revenues of the Berars were quite sufficient not only for that purpose but also to leave a large surplus. As is always the case after a cession of this kind in India,

the schedules framed on native administration were found greatly to under-estimate the actual revenue, and a systematic survey and settlement soon discovered an immense amount of concealed cultivation. The Doab, therefore, was no longer required for the purpose for which the treaty of 1853 had been framed, and the restoration of this small province was only an act of justice. Then we forgave the debt of fifty lakhs of rupees, towards the payment of which the surplus revenues of the provinces ceded in 1853 were by treaty to have been devoted. There is certainly an appearance of generosity about this, but it must be borne in mind first of all, that, since we had during the seven years of our administration given no accounts, as by treaty we were bound to do, and that in 1860 we admitted that the Doab was not required in order to meet the cost of the Contingent, it is exceedingly probable that for some time before 1860 the revenues of the Doab (about twenty lakhs) had been an actual surplus in our hands; and that, therefore, a large amount of the debt had been wiped out. But this was not all. The Hyderabad State agreed to cede to us certain taluqs lying on the banks of the Godavery which were worth from two to three lakhs of

rupees annually, which, capitalized at four per cent. were themselves sufficient to cover the whole debt. One more boon we granted, and that was the handing over to Hyderabad of the State of Shorapore. Shorapore was a small state tributary to Hyderabad, but during the mutiny the Rajah rebelled, and had to be subdued by our forces. His territories were then forfeited and were held by us. The Nizam being the suzerain of Shorapore, this rebellion may be said to have been as much against his authority as against that of the British. Under any circumstances we got nothing from Shorapore before the mutiny, and as the Nizam was during that time our ally it would have been difficult to find a good reason for retaining land which belonged to his vassal.

When, therefore, we look closely into the details of the rewards for loyalty granted to Hyderabad in 1860, we find that as far as generosity is concerned there is very little to boast about. We gave her back what was her own and nothing more. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the revenues of these restored districts helped Sir Salar Jung very greatly in his measures of reform, and he was also wise enough to continue the system of administration which he found had been intro-

duced by us, and gradually to extend it to other districts. It was in this way that the first steps were taken towards the organization of the Police and of the Department of Public Works.

The foregoing must serve as a slight sketch of the different stages that Hyderabad has passed through up to the time of the death of Sir Salar Jung, two and a half years ago. There are many more points of interest, but space will not allow me to dwell upon them here. It is now necessary to take a glance at the administration of the present time. First of all comes the Revenue department. This department may be said to be in a very high state of efficiency and, with the exception of some parts of the Telingana districts, it will probably bear comparison with anything that we can show in British territory. I do not say it is perfect, but during my 16 years' revenue experience in our own districts, I also failed to find a perfect revenue administration anywhere, so that this qualification is scarcely a disparagement as far as Hyderabad is concerned. In the Mahratta districts especially, the revenue appears to be promptly and easily collected, and throughout the whole province the collection was last year 97 per cent. of the demand. In the

Mahratta districts it was as high as 99 per cent. The average assessment in the Mahratta districts is very reasonable, being about 14 annas for dry, and between four and five rupees for wet land, —a small assessment when the fertility of this part of the Deccan is borne in mind. It is watered by several large rivers, and the soil is exceedingly fertile; artificial irrigation is very seldom needed, and the soil and climate are so good that it pays the ryot better to raise cotton and maize by the help of the rainfall, than to undertake the labour and cost which are inseparable from the cultivation of rice. In the Telingana districts the average assessment is higher, but it must be remembered that no survey has as yet been made of this part of the country, and whenever a survey of two or three villages has been made, it has always been found that the land actually in occupation is about double the extent it is represented to be. In this part of the country there is a great deal of rice cultivation, and there are some splendid irrigation works. The country, however, is very much under-populated (in one district averaging only about 80 to the square mile) and there are not sufficient cultivators to take up the available land. It was here that in former days the old Hindoo kingdom of Worangal had its capital;

it was here that the greatest slaughter took place at the time of the Muhammadan conquest in the 14th century, and for many years subsequently. From this slaughter the country does not appear to have recovered, and a vast amount of land which in former years must have been irrigated now lies waste, or is covered by impenetrable and deadly jungles and forests. There is, however, a future in store for this portion of the Hyderabad Province; it is here that the extensive coal fields are situated, and there is little doubt that there is, besides, an immense amount of undeveloped mineral wealth. A railway is now being opened out to Worangal, and when this has been completed and joined to the main arteries of India, to the north at Nagpore, and to the east at Bezwada in the Madras Presidency, we may reasonably hope for a new era in the history of Hyderabad.

Perhaps the best test of the efficiency of the Revenue Department is the manner in which it has been able to perform some of the extra duties that have devolved upon it. Three of these deserve notice;—the Survey, the Settlement, and the Famine of 1876-77. The survey was commenced eleven years ago and has been supervised and carried out almost entirely by

Hyderabad native officials. The executive head was Moolavie Mahadi Ali—at present known as Nawab Muneer Nawaz Jung, the gentleman whose letter regarding the state of Mussalman feeling in India attracted some attention a few months ago. This officer had been a Deputy Collector in the North-West Provinces, and was brought from there to Hyderabad by Sir Salar Jung. A valuable acquisition he has proved, for during the last ten years he has been the prime mover in every revenue and financial reform that has been carried out. Trained in the system of survey in force in the North West, he was naturally inclined to introduce a similar system into Hyderabad, but before doing so he spent some time in studying the Bombay methods. He soon became convinced that the Bombay plan of survey was better suited to that part of the country, and throwing aside old traditions he set about his new work. He had first to teach himself, and then his subordinates, but he was so successful that when, after three or four years, his work was tested, the errors were found to be far below the margin allowed, and could compare favourably with surveys in our own provinces. In the same way the Settlement followed, and now that nearly half the whole Province has been survey-

ed and settled, the actual cost per acre amounts to only a very little more than three annas, a figure which is exceedingly reasonable, and smaller than what we can show in many a district of our own territory. The survey and settlement are now thoroughly organized and are placed under one head, Major-General Glassfurd who is at present in England.

The famine of 1876-77 was chiefly felt in the Southern and Western Districts adjoining the Bombay and the Madras Presidencies. There was distress and pressure all over the province, but actual famine only in these parts. The whole management of the famine shows the excellent organization of the Revenue establishment. As soon as matters began to look dangerous in September 1876, a Central Committee was formed with Mr. Mahadi Ali as Secretary, Special Commissioners were despatched to each part of the province and a systematic plan of action was resolved upon. There seem to have been no divided counsels, as was unfortunately the case in this Presidency, and when at the commencement of 1877 Sir Richard Temple visited Hyderabad as Famine Delegate he was able to report that everything was well in hand. One satisfactory part of the famine management was that all the differ-

ent departments loyally co-operated with each other, working under the orders of the Central Committee, and some of the work turned out appears to have been exceedingly creditable. By the end of 1877 the actual famine was almost over, and although the Mansion House Committee made an offer to Sir Salar Jung of a portion of the funds at their disposal he generously declined it. To those who are accustomed to the routine and organization of a British district all this may seem to be undeserving of any particular notice, but if we look back for a moment to the state of the province as I have depicted it, when Sir Salar Jung assumed office in 1853, it will be understood how vast were the changes that he had introduced. If a famine had occurred twenty years before the people would have died by thousands, and whatever funds might have been sanctioned for their relief would have found their way into the pockets of the officials.

The greatest fault to be found with the Revenue Department is that its officials are also invested with judicial powers. In fact, apart from the courts in the capital and the suburbs, there are no independent judicial officers at all. The district Commissioners, Collectors, and Tahsildars, exercise both civil and criminal

powers. In our own districts it is bad enough, but there the revenue officials exercise only magisterial powers and there is a separate court in each district for the trial of the more serious criminal offences. In every district the civil cases are under an entirely separate department. Unfortunately at present this evil admits of no remedy. The State funds would not bear the expense of a separate judicial department and the Stamp Act in force is not of a nature to make the courts of law self-supporting, inasmuch as one object of Sir Salar Jung's policy was to make the cost of litigation as small as possible. The result is inevitable. When the returns from litigation are so small that they bear only an infinitesimal proportion to the cost of the law courts, separate courts will not, and cannot be maintained. I believe that I am correct in saying that during the last year the whole collections under the Stamp Act were not much over two lakhs of rupees. Another blot is that most of the noblemen claim the privilege of being exempted from stamp dues, and the result is that the poor alone pay what little revenue is derived from stamps. Some of the chiefs however, learning a lesson from their own exemption, introduce stamp fees in their own jaghirs, and thus derive a revenue

which ought properly to belong to the Government, and which by this means they obtain from the very people it was intended to exempt. This is a subject which requires thorough reform, and a moderate Stamp Act should be introduced, the revenue from which, though perhaps not sufficient to make the courts absolutely self-supporting, should go a long way towards providing for their cost. This having been done, a regular judicial establishment should be introduced throughout the province and should be entirely independent of the Revenue Department.

The Department of Public Works is a comparatively new creation having been established for not more than 12 years. It has done much good work, but the funds at its disposal are entirely inadequate to the requirements of the Province. The result is that the proportion of the cost of establishment to the cost of actual work turned out varies from 25 to 30 per cent., and the total amount expended amounts only to between 13 and 14 lakhs. Out of this expenditure too much is spent in the neighbourhood of the capital, and too little attention is paid to seeing that those persons who benefit from agricultural improvements carried out at Government cost, contribute towards the return which

should make such works remunerative. For instance, a large channel has been dug from an irrigation tank some miles distant from the capital, at a cost of more than 20 lakhs. This channel is a good work, and has been well carried out, and the benefit of it is said to be very great. The water brought by the channel is, however, used almost entirely by noblemen and jaghirdars; through whose lands it flows, and they contribute absolutely nothing in return for the benefit which they receive. Now this is unreasonable, and though it might be unfair to expect them to pay for the actual cost of the work, it is only fair that they should pay for the increased benefits which they enjoy. There would be probably no difficulty and no hesitation in making a *ryot* pay a water cess, and there can be no reason why a nobleman, who can better afford to do so, should be exempted.

It would be tedious to enumerate all the different departments, but suffice it to say that they are all being gradually placed on an efficient footing. The Police has been reorganized on the Madras system, there is a regular department for the administration of jails, (though in this respect I hear that in remote stations there is much supervision required), there is a forest department (in which

again there is a room for considerable improvement), and all the other departments necessary for the transaction of the business of a great State. There is, however, one thing which should be borne in mind, *viz.*, that there is always a danger of repeating the mistake of burning the candle at both ends, which led to the embarrassments previous to 1853. Establishments, framed on a European scale, are very costly, and there is no room for the entertainment also of the supernumeraries and hangers-on, so common in native States, who hold nominal appointments and do nothing; and as long as the enormous sum of 60 lakhs per annum is spent on an army in addition to the Contingent and Subsidiary forces, it will be impossible to provide sufficient funds to enable the different departments to carry out the reforms and improvements which are needed.

There are two branches of revenue in which it is probable that considerably more revenue might be realized, *viz.*, the Customs and the Abkary. As regards customs, not only is there reason to believe that *moglae* tricks are practised, but also here again the nobles enjoy an immunity from taxation, and are allowed to import their articles free. This is bad enough, but there can be no doubt that advantage is

often taken of this privilege to import, under the protection of a nobleman's pass, goods destined for other persons, and used for purposes of trade. The privilege of immunity should be done away with. But until this reform can be carried out, a system of drawback should be introduced under which all goods passing the custom-house should, at the time of passing, pay the prescribed duty ; but periodically the privileged individuals should be allowed to claim a refund of the duty paid, on production of the receipt. This would do away with the opportunity of smuggling goods for private individuals under the cover of a privileged pass. As regards abkary the old system of farming out the districts is in force. The result is an average consumption per head, throughout the province, of about four annas, which is half the average per head consumed in the Berars. There are, however, very great variations in the average amounts consumed per head in the different districts ; in some the figures being as much as six annas per head, and in others as low as one anna. This shows that under a proper administration this branch of the revenue could be very considerably improved. Excluding the city of Hyderabad the total revenue from this source is about 28 lakhs of H. S. rupees. If it in any

way approached the figures obtained in the Berars, it would amount to very nearly 50 lakhs of Government rupees. It is probable that a properly organized excise system would be found to bring about a great improvement in this branch of the revenue. Here again, however, there is the same difficulty to contend with in the exemption claimed by the noblemen and large proprietors, and as long as this is permitted, a large preventive force would be required to prevent smuggling from the numerous scattered estates.

There is, therefore, still a great deal to be done, and though Sir Salar Jung accomplished wonders, he has left enough for his son to carry out, to show that he is worthy of such a father. The present Minister seems to be thoroughly aware that there is work to be done and sets his shoulder honestly to the wheel. His main wish is to do justice and uphold the honour and credit of the State. This has been strikingly shown in the settlement of the claims of the Sultan Nawaz Jung, about which, since the disturbance which took place during the last Mohurram, so much has been said. The claim upon the Government was only an indirect one, the original debt having been incurred by a third party under a promise of the late Minister

that he would see that the money was paid. There were other counter claims by the Government and it became tolerably clear that the court appointed to decide upon the matter would give their decision against the Sultan. But the Minister was unwilling that the shadow of a suspicion should rest upon the good faith of the Government, and was especially anxious that any guarantee made by his father should be conscientiously fulfilled. Accordingly, though there can be little doubt that the Government would have gained the legal decree, terms were offered which amply covered any guarantee for which the Government might possibly have been liable. These terms satisfied the Sultan and were willingly accepted by him. In all his work the present Minister is thoroughly supported by his brother Muneer-ul-Moolk. Of course both being young they have much to learn, but this they are ready to do, and—a rare thing in this world—when they ask for advice they are willing to take it. The great want which they feel is the aid of honest, able, and experienced men. Many of the higher officials are persons of ability and integrity, and any government might be proud of such men as Mahadi Ali, and Seyd Hussein Belgrami, but all of them are not of this stamp. Again, there is a great

dearth of well educated natives of the State who are fitted and willing to take subordinate posts, and thus earn the experience needed for the proper fulfilment of the duties of higher ones. This is one of the tasks for the future, and there can be no doubt that the present Government is anxious to offer every facility towards providing the necessary education.

Two or three questions seem to be of more importance than others, and indeed of such vital importance that unless they are properly solved, the State will never be as efficiently administered as it should be.

1. There should be a reduction in the expenditure on the army, not only as regards the regular and irregular forces maintained by the State, but also as regards the jaghir troops. The regular forces should be fixed at a strength sufficient for absolute requirements, and the holders of military fiefs should be made to pay an equivalent for the troops they are no longer required to maintain. Some attention was lately attracted to Mr. Mahadi Ali's letter to the *Bombay Gazette*, which was quoted in the *London Times* and discussed at the same time as another one on the same subject from Sir Lepel Griffin. If some such system as that advocated by Mr. Mahadi Ali were adopted in

Hyderabad, the State would have an opportunity of effecting the savings so urgently required, and there can be no doubt that any system which would alter the present one would be of benefit not only to the province but to the empire. At present we have the strange spectacle of a province, in a state of profound peace, in which three large armies are kept up at a cost of about 200 lakhs annually, but of which not a single regiment is available for the purposes of imperial defence. In addition to these forces there is another of irregulars which, instead of adding to the security of the country, is a constant menace to the well-being of the Government.

2. The necessity of adopting measures to restore the prosperity of those districts, which, having been depopulated in former years, are now in a wild and comparatively uncivilized state. If measures could be adopted to disband the armed men who are no longer required for purposes of defence, here is an occupation on which they could be well employed. They might literally be made to turn their swords into ploughshares, and to render good service to the State by helping to reclaim the many thousand acres now lying waste.

3 The development of the resources of the

country by the extension of railways, so as to tap the almost inexhaustible treasures of the coal fields. This would have the effect of introducing capital, and the prosperity of the people would soon follow.

4. The abolition of the numerous privileges under which the chiefs and nobles claim exemption from taxes and from the authority of the law. Office should be made the reward not of birth but of merit, and we should then hear less of the factions and intrigues of the Hyderabad noblemen, which have earned for the State so bad a name.

These would seem to be some of the obligations which the Hyderabad State has yet to meet; but have we, in our turn, none to fulfil towards her? If, as Lord Ripon said, it is righteousness that exalteth a nation, it would seem that we are bound to regard the cession of the Berars as a temporary act. When once we look upon our occupation of these districts in that light one-half of the difficulty will be got over. As soon as the State is able to pay for the Contingent it has pledged itself to maintain, and is able to provide fitting guarantees for the punctual performance of its pledges, then if treaties are to mean anything we are bound to restore the property which was only pledged to

us. It is no doubt a difficult thing to restore territory, but we have already made a partial restoration, and there can therefore be no reason, why, when the time comes, we should not complete what we have begun. The difficulty which such a restoration would entail will make the credit of it all the greater, and when it has been done then may we claim to be "exalted by our righteousness."

LETTERS

FROM

MYSORE.

I.

When Seringapatam fell in 1799 and the usurping Mahomedan dynasty of Hyder Ali came to an end, the British found some difficulty in deciding what to do with their conquest. We did not dare to assume possession of the whole Kingdom for fear of exciting the rivalry of the Nizam and of the Mahrattas. They had indeed been our allies during the war, and we were bound by treaty to divide with them equally the conquered province. But to do this would have been just as dangerous, for the Kingdom of Mysore extended from Palghat in the South to Adoni in the North, and from the Western Ghats to the Tripetty Hills

in the East. To have divided this enormous extent of country into three equal portions, and to have given one to each ally, would have been to have dangerously increased the power of both, and in case of a possible combination of the two against us, we were then scarcely in a position, just after our resources had been strained in order to accomplish the conquest of Mysore, to meet it without considerable risk. We had always treated Hyder and Tippoo as usurpers, and it was therefore out of the question that we should place one of the latter's sons on the throne, apart from the fact that such a Prince would never have remained on friendly terms with ourselves. The old Hindu royal line was almost extinct, at all events there was no direct heir, and all that remained were a few families, from which in former times wives had been taken by members of the Royal house, or sons taken into adoption. The last pageant king of the direct line had died in 1775, strangled in his bath by order of Hyder Ali for having opened communications with the Mahrattas, with the view of shaking off Hyder's yoke. Following out the wise policy of upholding the nominal power of the Rajah, whilst in reality all actual authority remained with himself, Hyder was anxious to find another

puppet to put upon the throne. There were, however, even then no boys of the direct male line, and he accordingly collected a number of children belonging to the different branches connected with the Royal family, and from them selected one. The circumstances of this selection are thus described by Wilks. "He ordered all the children to be collected from the different branches of the house, who according to ancient precedent were entitled to furnish a successor to the throne. The ceremonial observed on this occasion, however childish, was in perfect accordance with the feelings which he intended to delude, and sufficiently adapted to the superstition of the fatalist. The hall of audience was strewed round with fruits, sweetmeats and flowers, playthings of various descriptions, arms, books, male and female ornaments, bags of money, and every varied object of puerile or manly pursuit; the children were introduced together, and were all invited to help themselves to whatever they liked best; the greater number were quickly engaged in a scramble for the fruits, sweetmeats and toys; but one child was attracted by a brilliant little dagger, which he took up in his right hand, and soon afterwards a lime in his left. 'That is the Rajah!' exclaimed

Hyder, 'his first care is military protection; his second to realize the produce of his dominion; bring him hither, and let me embrace him.' The assembly was in an universal murmur of applause; and he ordered the child to be conducted to the Hindu palace and prepared for installation." The name of this Rajah was Cham Raj, but his rule was not destined to be a long one. When Hyder died in 1782 Tippoo, considering it unnecessary to continue the pageant of a Rajah, deposed him and relegated him to some tumble-down buildings in Seringapatam. Here he lived with five wives, a grandmother and some other female relatives of the late Rajah. The establishment allowed them by Tippoo was a very modest one, the total cost of the food, clothing and maintenance of the whole family being only Rs. 9,275 a year. The deposed Cham Rajah died somewhere between 1794 and 1799 leaving behind him an infant son, who, when Seringapatam fell, was only 5 years old. It can scarcely be said that this boy had any legal right to the throne by descent. As a matter of fact for the last hundred years the Rajahs of Mysore had been nothing more than State pageants, and even this line had died out. The throne had been usurped and the usurper had conquered a

territory infinitely larger than had ever been possessed by the rightful kings. The conquered usurper was *de facto* and *de jure* ruler of the country and the conquerors might have, with perfect justice, annexed the whole of his dominions, for he himself had provoked the war which led to his destruction. But, as I have shown above, we did not consider it wise to annex the kingdom for ourselves or to divide it between ourselves and our allies. The only other alternative was to slice it up and to give over a portion to a ruler who would be under our control. This was the reason that we installed *Kristna Raj Wadier* as Maharajah of Mysore. Some English writers have praised us for our generosity and forebearance on this occasion, but as a general rule, the history of the world shows that in cases of genuine conquest, it is seldom that much play is given to feelings of sentiment. It may be good policy to exercise forbearance, but if in such a case a nation adopts the policy which it considers best suited to its interests it cannot expect to be credited with generosity in its motives. In the same way a man who adopts for his principle of conduct the motto that "honesty is the best policy" is not honest because it is right to be honest, but because it is profitable to be so.

The question of generosity does not therefore enter into our relations with the Maharajah of Mysore; the principle by which we were actuated and which, if the truth may be said, is the principle by which all acts of State, whatever the nation may be, are actuated, was that of expediency. In the treaty which was signed every precaution was taken to protect our interests. The portion of territory assigned to the Maharajah consisted of about half the whole kingdom as it then stood. According to the amount of revenue calculated for, it was a little less than half, being in the relation of thirteen lakhs of pagodas as against fifteen which were distributed amongst the allies. We retained the districts to the south yielding a revenue of about 7 lakhs of pagodas, but burdened with a maintenance of about two lakhs to the family of Tippoo; the Nizam received the greater portion of the so called Ceded Districts, calculated to yield 6 lakhs and 70 thousand pagodas, but subject to the grant of a jaghir yielding seventy thousand, to Cummer-ud-din, Tippoo's chief general; and the remaining portion, valued at rather more than two lakhs and a half, was to go to the Peishwa. This latter territory more than represented the value of the services which that Prince had yielded dur-

ing the war, for he had actually taken little or no share, and the value of his alliance consisted mainly in the fact that he had not joined Tippoo. The Poishwa however was dissatisfied with the share allotted to him, and it was probably this dissatisfaction that five years later led to the out-break of the Mahratta war. For the present he merely refused to accept his share and it was consequently divided between the Nizam and ourselves. It consisted of districts now forming portions of the Bellary District. As regards the Nizam's share we have already seen how it passed into our hands as a payment for the subsidiary force which we bound ourselves to keep up at Hyderabad. The Maharajah, therefore, was left with a compact Province of some 27,000 square miles in extent, shut in on all sides, except to the North, where the Mahrattas still ruled, by districts in our possession. He was futher bound to pay seven and a half lakhs of pagodas as military contribution for the defence of his kingdom whilst from the revenues of the State he was to receive a fixed allowance of one lakh of pagodas and one-fifth of the net revenues. Assuming therefore the total revenue of his province to have been thirteen lakhs and seventy-four thousand pagodas, the military subsidy would amount to seven,

his personal allowance to a little more than two, and the State revenues to upwards of four lakhs. From these figures it would seem that the military subsidy was very high, being more than 50 per cent. of the whole revenue, but it must always be remembered that these calculations were utterly untrustworthy, as has invariably been the case when, in the course of our career in India, we have taken over a native province. The schedules used on this occasion were those which had been furnished by Tippoo after the first siege of Seringapatam in 1791, and in these the valuation of the different districts had been purposely under-estimated by about one-half of their real value. As a matter of fact therefore the revenues of the Maharajah's territory were not less than 20 lakhs of pagodas or about 70 lakhs of Rupees. The military subsidy was therefore 24 lakhs or a little more than one-third, and the Rajah's personal allowance, together with one-fifth of the net revenues, amounted to not less than 12 lakhs, leaving 34 lakhs for the purposes of administration. The Maharajah was also bound to furnish military assistance in the event of war, the extent of this assistance being left unlimited, and there was a further proviso that if there was any failure in the payment of

the subsidy we were to assume such portions of the territory as might be necessary, securing always to the Rajah the stipulated personal allowance.

The above were the circumstances under which the new Mysore Rajah was inaugurated, and it can scarcely be said that the task before the new administration was an easy one. The country had been reduced by nearly 50 years of constant warfare; the cultivators had been subjected to exactions without number; the land-owners had been oppressed, trade and commerce were stagnant, large tracts of country were depopulated and the whole province was in a highly critical state. For many years past Hyder and Tippoo had been able to carry on their numerous wars, not so much by the aid of the State resources as by means of the treasure which they had captured in the conquered towns. At Bednore alone, which had been captured by Hyder in 1763, and which had the reputation of being the richest town of Southern India, he had carried off a treasure valued at no less than 12 millions sterling, and Hyder himself used afterward to observe that this booty was the foundation of his subsequent greatness. It must not therefore be assumed that the fact of so many

wars having been carried on was a proof of the richness of the country. The time was one of the breaking up of the minor Indian States in consequence of the decline of the Delhi Empire. The sky was falling, and the boldest robbers succeeded in catching the most larks. Hyder had been one of these in a pre-eminent degree, but what he had amassed had been almost entirely dissipated by his son Tippoo, and when Seringapatam fell in 1799, all that remained was an almost exhausted treasury, and a well-nigh ruined country. The man, however, who was chosen to fill the post of Dewan to the infant Rajah was well fitted for the difficult task. This man was Poorneah. Poorneah was a Madhava Brahmin and a native of Coimbatore, which in Hyder's time formed a portion of the Mysore State. He had entered the service of the State early in life and had at first been employed in a very surbordinate capacity. He was subsequently employed in the Treasury, and it was here that he first attracted Hyder's notice. This extraordinary man, who throughout his life was never able to read or write, had nevertheless a remarkable aptitude for business. He would hear long accounts read over and at once detect an error, and there was scarcely a subject of importance that was

not brought to him for orders. It is one of the attributes of great men to be able to select great men as their subordinates. Throughout history we seldom find an example of a great man standing alone. He is always surrounded by a galaxy of genius. A great man's lieutenants are only second to him in greatness. The men of genius are always to be found, but it is the fate of mediocrity to be unable to detect them, the reason probably being that such persons are so eaten up by their own conceit that they can look no further than themselves. They are therefore inclined to select those only who will treat them with adulation and flattery. The first and the third Napoleons are examples of this law in modern European history, and Hyder and Tippoo are illustrations of the same. Hyder was born to create a kingdom, and as he himself always prophesied, his son Tippoo was born to lose what his father had gained. Under Hyder, Poorneah rapidly rose to the first place in the administration of the State. He appears to have been a man of strict honesty, of considerable administrative talent, and of strict if not parsimonious habits. He generally accompanied his master on his expeditions, and it was owing mainly to his foresight that when Hyder died Tippoo was able to ascend the

throne without opposition. This death occurred whilst Hyder was returning from a campaign in South Arcot. For many years Hyder had been suffering from carbuncle, a disease which appears to be common amongst Indians of high rank, so much so that it is generally known as the "Rajah's boil." When Hyder's death occurred, the army was marching home through the Chengamah pass, a narrow defile of the Jawady hills about 30 miles from Tripatore in the Salem District. Tippoo was then on the Western Coast, and, knowing that if the army should hear of their leader's death, a mutiny would be inevitable, the astute Dewan kept the occurrence concealed. The body was secretly embalmed, wrapped in spices, placed in a closed palankeen, and carried as usual on the daily march. Each day Poorneah went to the doors of the palankeen, and was apparently engaged in conversation with the occupant, after which he gave out that Hyder was doing well but was still suffering from weakness. In the meantime a mounted messenger had been despatched to Tippoo, more than 500 miles distant, with the news of his father's death. Tippoo at once left his camp, and travelled post haste to Seringapatam which must have been between 300 and 400 miles distant from the

place where the news reached him. So secretly and expeditiously was the matter arranged, that twenty-one days after his father's death, Tippoo was in the capital, and simultaneously with the publication of the news he assumed charge of the Government. This solitary incident may serve as a good example of Poorneah's fidelity and sagacity. Under the head-strong and suspicious Tippoo, Poorneah had by no means an easy time of it, not only was he in constant danger of false charges being brought against him, (and my readers will well understand what Indian court intrigues are, especially in such a court as that of Tippoo must have been,) but the fanaticism of his new master was such, that he, a Brahmin, was often in danger of being made a forcible convert to Muhammadanism. This species of conversion was practised upon thousands on the Western coast and was often employed on Tippoo's personal adherents. One case brought about its own revenge. When for the first time in 1791 Lord Cornwallis marched upon Seringapatam, the fort of Bangalore fell almost without a struggle. Treachery had been at work, and the walking stick of an emissary from the intelligence department of the British army, was found to contain a treasonous letter from

Mahomed Abbas, a Brahmin forcibly circumcised. "Abbass fully confessed but refused to implicate others. 'How long' said Tippoo 'have you been a traitor?' 'From the period that you began to circumcise Brahmins,' was the undaunted reply. The unfortunate man was dragged to death at the feet of an elephant, and some other Hindus supposed to be implicated were strangled" (Wilks). For nearly seventeen years, however, Poorneah managed to steer clear of these dangers, and when at last Seringapatam fell, and his master's dynasty was at end, he proved to be so useful to the conquerors in the settlement of the accounts and the pacification of the country, that he was chosen to be the Dewan of the new Rajah. Colonel Barry Close was the first British Resident and the future Duke of Wellington (then General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley) was the Commandant of Seringapatam. So exhausted were the pecuniary resources of the country that before the work of reform was commenced, a loan of several lakhs of Rupees had to be taken from the British Government to enable the current expenses to be paid. The first step was a very wise one,—it was publicly notified that all outstanding arrears of land revenue were remitted, thus enabling the

cultivators to start afresh. In a little more than a year Poorneah was able to repay the loan to the British Government; the subsidy was punctually paid and there was at the same time a large surplus in the treasury.

By far the most interesting and reliable account of the administration of the Mysore Province is to be found in the official report of the year 1872-73, compiled, I believe, by the late Mr. W. Wellesley of the Madras Civil Service, who was then Secretary to the Chief Commissioner. In it we find that the amount of revenue derived from the State from the middle of 1799 to the end of 1802 was only Rs. 65,85,419, or an average of about 20 lakhs per annum. This I fancy must be a mistake, for this amount would have been insufficient to meet the military subsidy alone. The figures probably represent the average revenue for these years. This would seem to be the more probable, because in the following year 1803-4 the total land revenue is given at 65 lakhs (round numbers) and from this time it annually increased until it reached in 1808-9 a total of very nearly 80 lakhs of Rupees. During the two following years it declined to 70 and 60 lakhs respectively, these being the two last years of Poorneah's administration. It is, however, a

remarkable thing that during these years of native administration the land revenue reached a higher figure than it subsequently did at any period up to within a few years ago. It is difficult to account for this high rent-roll except by ascribing it to the result of good administration. Some writers, and amongst them Colonel Malleson and the author of the 1872 report, charged Poorneah with having overtaxed the people and by excessive rates brought about a fictitious state of financial prosperity which in reality tended to impoverish the country. This, however, would scarcely seem to be fair; writing so many years after events it is easy to bring a charge of this kind, but exceedingly difficult to prove it. The fall of the revenue in the last two years may have been due to famine, loss of crops, reduced assessments or many other causes. At all events whenever a native State under our management increases in revenue we are in the habit of pointing to the increase as a proof of our good administration, and it is therefore only fair to apply the same test in the present case. This, for instance, was the test applied in the case of Sir Thomas Munro. This celebrated man was placed in charge of the district conquered from Mysore and given to the Nizam as his share, but afterwards ceded by him to

us in payment of the Subsidiary Force at Hyderabad. The two cases are very nearly parallel. Here are two provinces which belonged to the same State, taken over immediately after the war and administered, the one by an European officer of the very highest, and acknowledged, merit, and the other by a native. Sir Thomas ruled the Ceded Districts from the time of their cession for the first eight years, and Poorneah for eleven, so that the periods of time very nearly correspond. Let us now look at the results; as shown above, the schedule assessment for the Ceded Districts (*i. e.*, the Nizam's share of the conquered territory, plus the share declined by the Peishwa,) amounted to about 9½ lakhs of pagodas or say Rupees 30,00,000 in round numbers. As usual this estimate was found to be too low, and in the first year the collections amounted to 33 lakhs. This sum increased every year until in 1809, the highest year of Poorneah's revenue, it amounted, in round numbers to 55 lakhs, being an increase of something more than two-thirds. It is true that in 1809 Munro was no longer in India, having left in 1807, but in the year of his departure the revenue was as high as 45 lakhs, and the subsequent further rise is generally admitted to have been due to his administration.

Now the schedule assessment of Mysore was $13\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs of pagodas or say 45 lakhs of Rupees. It is only fair to assume, as in reality was the case, that in Mysore also the schedules were under-estimated, and we will suppose that they amounted to 50 lakhs. This being so the amount of revenue realised in 1809 ($77\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs) was only a little more than 50 per cent. in excess of what it had been when Poorneah assumed charge. The increase in British territory, however, had been more than 66 per cent. There would however have been far greater reason for supposing that Munro levied an unfair assessment than that Poorneah did so, because the schedules he went by were those which Tippoo had submitted in 1791. Now at that time it was Tippoo's object to make out that the outlying districts were very valuable, because it was from them that he had to make cessions; while the home districts were purposely underestimated in order that the British should leave to him as many as possible. It is therefore extremely probable that the actual revenue of Mysore in the first year was very much greater than the scheduled amount, and that the increase in 1809 was in reality not more than 20 or 25 per cent. In the Ceded Districts it was different, and there can be no doubt that

the rates there taken were too high, because before he left Munro himself recommended a general reduction all round of 25 per cent. on dry, and 33 per cent. on wet land. It would therefore seem that the increase under Poorneah was nothing more than a legitimate one, and it is most unfair that our administrator who increased the revenue by 66 per cent., and who himself admitted that the rates were too high, should be extolled to the skies as a model European administrator, whilst Poorneah, who only apparently increased the revenue by 50 per cent. and in reality by about 25 per cent., should be reproached with having impoverished the country. There are, unfortunately, only too many legitimate causes for fault finding in native administration, and it is therefore doubly incumbent upon us to do full justice to those who deserve praise. Another proof that Poorneah's rates could not have been excessive is to be found in the perfect repose in which the country remained during his rule. During the first year immediately after the fall of Seringapatam, the country was in a disturbed state. This was to be expected where so large an army as that of Tippoo had to be disbanded. But with this exception the country remained in a state of profound peace, although after

the Dewan left office, two years of the young Rajah's mismanagement were sufficient to set the country in a blaze. If Poorneah had rack-rented the ryots they would have risen long before. After a year and a half had passed under the new administration, General Wellesley wrote to the Resident, Colonel Close: "The Dewan under your direction seems to pursue the wisest and most benevolent course for the promotion of industry and opulence, the protection of property, and the maintenance of internal tranquillity and order in Mysore." Evidence of this kind written at the time by such a man as Arthur Wellesley, must outweigh all detraction made fifty or sixty years after the events. Poorneah's zeal and ability were further recognized by the grant to him of one per cent. on the revenues, in addition to his salary, a boon which was gained for him by Josiah Webbe of the Madras Council. In gratitude Poorneah erected to Webbe a granite pillar to the north of Seringapatam, which however is now known by the name of the "Ranakhambha" or bloody pillar, since it was here, in 1809, that the last scene of the tragedy was acted which was brought on by Sir George Barlow's indiscretion. I allude, of course, to the unhappy mutiny of the

British troops in Seringapatam, Vellore, and Hyderabad.

Poorneah may have been parsimonious, but he was not niggardly in spending money on the improvement of the country. During his eleven years of office he spent no less than Rs. 77,29,310 on public works, nearly fifty of which were devoted to irrigation works, such as tanks and channels. The other works were wells, bridges, bungalows, chuttrams, cutcherries, &c., and one work of great magnitude known as Poorneah's Nalla cost no less than 17½ lakhs.

This work unfortunately has never been finished. The object of it was to bring the water of the Cauvery into Mysore. Some European engineers have declared the scheme to be impracticable owing to the levels, but it is to be doubted whether so shrewd a man would have spent so much money on an impossible task. I am the rather inclined to believe that when Poorneah left office, there was no one with the wish or the determination to carry the work through. Roads do not seem to have engaged the Dewan's attention, for during his term of office he spent only Rs. 67,762 on their construction and repairs. With reference to this subject the author of the report of 1872 says "Poorneah's ignorance of

the impetus which roads would give is excusable, seeing that even several years after this period, a Secretary to a neighbouring government gravely impresses upon a too restless engineer, that His Excellency in Council could see no necessity for spending money on the roads he proposed for the reason that as yet there were no carts to take advantage of them." Altogether during his eleven years of office Poorneah spent on an average more than seven lakhs on public works, or seven lakhs more than the total spent during 25 years of British management from 1831 to 1856, and within two lakhs of the total amount spent last year. To have done this shows not only what enlightened views this really great Indian statesman must have had, but also what a careful and thrifty supervision he must have exercised over every branch, for not only was the whole internal machinery of administration kept in thorough order, but when he left office there was in the Treasury an accumulation of no less than seventy-five lakhs of pagodas (262 lakhs of Rupees), besides jewels, &c., of considerable value. In addition to this a rough survey and settlement had been carried out, and every department was in a thoroughly efficient state.

And now let us look at the reward which was given to this eminent statesman, of whom India may well be proud. After a life time spent in honourable and faithful service to the State, he died superseded and broken hearted. In 1811 the young Rajah was sixteen years of age, and it chafed him to be under the control of so thrifty a minister; accordingly he told the Resident that he wished to govern for himself, and the Dewan was dispensed with. The Resident endeavoured to secure him a share in the administration, but he declined to take office as a subordinate, and retired into private life. This was the signal for the vultures, of which there are so many in every country and especially in India. Charges of peculation were brought against him and he was ordered by the Rajah to refund a large amount of money which would have left him nearly penniless. A portion he paid and then the Resident interfered and the remainder was remitted, and the broken hearted aged minister was allowed to depart to his jaghir. This was in December 1811. The British Government still showed him favour and soon afterwards he received a communication from the Governor-General offering him a pension of five hundred pagodas (Rs. 1,750 per mensem). But

it was too late; the ingratitude of his Prince had broken his heart, and on the 29th March 1812 he died. He might well have exclaimed in the words of Holy Writ—Put not your trust in Princes. He left behind him a family, and his grandson now occupies an honourable post in the service of the State.

II.

When the Maharajah assumed the reins Government in 1811 he found a well order State, a treasury with an accumulation of mo than 200 lakhs of Rupees, and a contented cou try. He was then sixteen years of age, impu sive and fond of pleasure. He conceived th idea of governing absolutely, and was only to glad to throw off the yoke of the thrifty mini ter who had kept his youth in check. Unfortu nately there were too many unprincipled pe sons ready to take advantage of his easy natur He was soon surrounded by sycophants ar courtiers who robbed him and the State rig and left. Temptations were thrown in h way to which he yielded only too readily, ar amidst the pleasures and excitements of a sensual and voluptuous Court he left the affairs of State in neglect. In less than two years after

his accession to power, the whole of the accumulated treasure had been squandered and the Maharajah's life was a career of unbridled dissipation. The author of the report of 1872 thus describes the state of things. "All remonstrances failed to check the Rajah's downward career. High offices of State were sold to the highest bidder while the people were oppressed by the system of *Sharti* which had its origin under Poorneah's regency. *Sharti* was a contract made by the Amildar that he would realize for the Government a certain amount of revenue; that if his collections should fall short of that amount he would make good the deficiency, and that if they exceeded it, the surplus should be paid to the Government. The amount which the Amildar thus engaged to realize was generally an increase on what had been obtained the year preceding. In the muchilka or agreement, the Amildar usually bound himself not to oppress the ryots, nor impose any new taxes, nor compel the ryots to purchase the Government share of garden produce, but this proviso was merely formal; for any violation of the contractors on any of these points when represented to the Government, was taken no notice of. The consequence was that the ryots became impoverished, the

revenues more embarrassed, and the Amildars themselves frequently suffered losses. The distress arising from this state of things and from the neglect of duties incumbent upon Government, fell heavily upon the ryots who groaned under the oppression of every tyrannical Sharti, Fouzdar or Amildar." Under a careful and vigilant minister this system might have worked well, but under a lax and profligate government, like the Rajah's, it could have but one result.

We have seen what that result was in the case of Hyderabad, and in Mysore it was the same. Things went on from bad to worse, and although Sir Thomas Munro, in 1817, paid Mysore a visit, and warned the Rajah of the ruin he was bringing upon himself and the State, it was of no use, for the reckless Prince would listen to no advice. On his return from this visit Sir Thomas Munro, in writing to the Marquis of Hastings on the affairs of India generally, said regarding the Maharajah. "He is indolent and prodigal, and has already, besides the current revenue dissipated about sixty lakhs of pagodas of the treasure laid up by the said Dewan. He is mean, artful, revengeful and cruel. He does not take away life, but he inflicts the most disgraceful and in-

human punishments, on men of every rank, at a distance from his capital, where he thinks it will remain unknown to Europeans; and though young he is already detested by his subjects." But the Supreme Government did not act upon this warning, solemn though it was, and allowed the state of misgovernment to continue for twenty years. The revenues annually decreased until at last the land revenue was less than half what it was during Poorneah's administration, and the whole country was on the verge of bankruptcy. The Rajah himself was deeply in debt, and the debts went on increasing at a frightful rate. The Court lived from hand to mouth, and every opportunity was seized to grind money from the ryots. As an example of this oppression we may mention that when we afterwards assumed the Government we did away with no less than seven hundred and sixty-nine petty items of taxation. "Among these were such whimsical taxes, as those on marriage, on incontinency, on a child being born, on its being given a name, and on its head being shaved. In one village the inhabitants had to pay a tax because their ancestors had failed to find the stray horse of a Poligar, and any one passing a particular spot in Nagar without keeping his hands close to his side

had to pay a tax." (Report of 1872). A picture of this kind should be a warning to some of those rabid reformers of the Seymour Keay stamp, that, when they abuse the British Government for the taxes it has introduced, and state that under Native Governments the people had fewer burdens to bear, they are stating what is not true.

At length the time arrived when the people could bear this oppression no longer, and they broke out into open revolt. This was especially the case in the Nagar division, where several of the Poligars assumed independence, and a pretender was set up as the representative of the old Ikkeri Rajahs who had been dispossessed by Hyder. The Rajah's troops were sent out, and though, when it actually came to fighting, they were generally victorious, they were utterly unable to quell the revolt. The Rajah was at last compelled to admit his inability to restore quiet and asked for the assistance of British troops. This was given to him, and in a short time the rebellion was effectually suppressed. This being done, the Resident was called upon to submit a full report on the state of the country and on the causes which had led to the disturbances. His report showed that the mismanagement of the

Rajah had produced grave and widely spread discontent, that the revenues were rapidly falling and that mal-administration was rampant in all departments of the State. The Governor General therefore determined to act upon the fourth and fifth articles of the subsidiary treaty. Formal notice was given to the Rajah, and ten days afterwards we took over the reins of Government. This was in 1830, and from that time up to 1879, when the present Maharajah reached his majority, the Province of Mysore was under our administration. The Rajah received an ample allowance, (three and a half lakhs of Rupees in addition to one-fifth of the gross revenues), and henceforth took no share in the Government of the country.

At starting it was intended to administer the country entirely by means of native agency, but it was soon found that the whole system was rotten to the very core, and that a radical change was required. At first there were two Commissioners, a senior and a junior, but in this arrangement there was necessarily a good deal of friction and it was soon abandoned. Again, the courts of justice had no power to pass sentence and could do nothing more than pronounce the offenders "guilty or not guilty." The Rajah had been allowed to retain the

power of passing sentence in each case, and as he was too indolent to attend to business, the jails remained for years crowded with prisoners. This of course was also a source of corruption, for men of means had an opportunity of bribing the Rajah's advisers in order to get lenient sentences. The system was accordingly changed; the country was divided into four divisions, at the head of each of which was a Commissioner, and at the head of all was the Chief Commissioner, assisted by a Judicial Commissioner. Throughout the whole Province the higher offices were filled by Europeans and the Government was in every way conducted in the same manner as that of a British Province.

These changes were not completed until 1843 when General Cubbon was appointed the first Chief Commissioner. He had already been the Resident for nearly ten years,—since 1834,—and he continued at the head of affairs until 1861 when he finally retired. For very nearly thirty years he was therefore the administrator of the Province, and to his wise and paternal rule are due the great strides which the country made towards improvement. It has often been stated that a personal or 'patriarchal' form of Government is what is best suited to India. The danger however about this form of

Government is, that, when it descends to inferior hands it is so terribly open to abuse. We see the results of this Government under Poorneah and under the Maharajah. General Cubbon's government was for the greater part of the time a personal one, but as time went on a stricter regime was introduced. Under the modern system there is less opportunity for doing good except in one's own department, but there is also far less opportunity for doing harm.

In course of time, under General Cubbon, the whole system was reorganized and the result was a steady increase in the prosperity of the country. On the one hand the revenue increased and on the other the expenditure diminished. The Maharajah had not only exhausted the treasury, but he had also incurred some enormous personal liabilities and these had to be paid off. These debts amounted to no less than Rs. 87,73,261 and the liquidation extended over a period of 25 years. At the end of this time a memoir on the subject of Mysorian finance was submitted to Lord Dalhousie (1856) by whom the results of the revenue administration were summed up in the following words. "During the period of 25 years which has elapsed since Mysore came under the adminis-

tration of British Officers every department has felt the hand of reform. An enormous number of direct taxes have been abolished, relieving the people in direct payment to the extent of $10\frac{3}{4}$ lakhs a year, and doubtless the indirect relief given by this measure has exceeded even the direct relief. Excepting a low tax upon coffee, (which is raised upon public land free of rent or land tax,) no new tax appears to have been imposed, and no old tax appears to have been increased. Nevertheless the public revenue has risen from 44 to 82 lakhs of Rupees per annum." From this period the revenue went on steadily increasing until in 1872-73 it reached within a few Rupees of 110 lakhs. During Sir Mark Cubbon's regime there had been a very tight hand kept over the expenditure, and when he retired in 1861 there was a very considerable accumulation of treasure. When he retired, however, a different state of things was introduced. General Cubbon had made large use of native agency, but it was then resolved to re-organize the establishments after the model of British Districts. Indeed they went further, and compared with most of our own provinces, the Mysore Districts were over-officered. New departments were established and were paid on a scale which

was considered suited to a State with a yearly increasing revenue and an annually growing surplus. This at all events had the effect of bringing the expenditure more on a level with the income and the cash balances no longer continued to increase.

In 1868 the Maharajah died, leaving only an adopted son, the present Maharajah. This adoption was recognized by the British Government, but the Maharajah being a minor, the Government was continued as heretofore until he should reach his majority. At the same time the opportunity was taken to frame another treaty, under which the Maharajah agreed, when he should assume the reins of Government to pay an increased subsidy of 10½ lakhs annually. There was some show of reason for this because, since under our management the revenues had greatly increased and there was a large balance, it seemed only fair that the Province should pay for the benefits it had received. At the same time, it is to be regretted that this demand should have been made. The amount of subsidy fixed in 1799 is in reality amply sufficient to cover the cost of the military. It is now no longer necessary to have a large force in order to defend the Mysore State against her neighbours. The country is

as quiet as a British District, and compared with the amount paid by other native States in the north of India, the subsidy is already far larger in proportion to the revenues than is paid elsewhere. Besides either the succession of the young Maharajah was legal or it was not. If the adoption was legal he should not have been made to pay for his succession; if it was illegal no payment should have been deemed sufficient to warrant us in countenancing an illegality. It must always be remembered that matters are very different now from what they were fifty years ago. Then the Maharajah had control over the revenues. He took for himself what he chose, and spent the rest on the country. Now the civil list is strictly defined, and he can take neither more nor less than the allotted sum. The extra 10½ lakhs will therefore come not from the Maharajah but from the State, in which progress is already checked because the establishments, framed on a European scale, are so poorly paid that it is difficult to get good men. It is the people of Mysore who have to pay the increased subsidy, and this they cannot afford to do. No doubt the principal reason for demanding the increased subsidy was the fact that there were at the time of the Maharajah's death such large accumulations of revenue

amounting to about 40 lakhs of Rupees. There was then an annual surplus of about 8 lakhs of Rupees, and writing in 1872, the author of the Report says: "The State is now free from all liabilities with a steadily increasing income, an ample cash balance and an invested surplus of 40 lakhs. Though the expenditure is large compared with that of former years, when primitive institutions prevailed, and the country was still involved in debt, it represents the cost of a reformed administration on the model of British Institutions." And yet thirteen years after this was written, now that Mysore is again under a Native Government, we hear of nothing but the critical state of her Finances. Not only are her cash balances exhausted but she is in debt to the amount of 80 lakhs of Rupees; her revenues barely exceed her expenditure, and are now about 8 lakhs of Rupees less than they were in 1872, and when, as it was feared only a few months ago, a famine was expected, it seemed as if the State could with difficulty have escaped from bankruptcy.

What can be the reason of this change? There are some who do not hesitate to say that it is due to the change of the Government. Under British administration the country was prosperous, but seven years of native rule have

been sufficient to bring it to the verge of bankruptcy. Is this true? In order to find the correct answer, let us look at what has taken place during the last thirteen years. Although the apparent prosperity of the country was in 1872 so great, it would seem that but little had been done towards the inner improvement. It is true that there had been an immense development of the Department of Public Works, and that a great deal of money had been spent on opening out communications, but, compared with what had been done elsewhere, Mysore was in a most backward state. Bangalore was the only city in direct communication with the railway. The western and northern portions of the State were almost inaccessible. A great deal of money had been spent on irrigation works, but at the same time a great many had been allowed to fall into disrepair. Nor can it be said that the works we undertook were always selected with fairness or even judgment. Take for instance the tank upon which seven lakhs of Rupees were spent, nominally to supply Bangalore with water, but mainly in order to bring water into the British cantonment and to the European barracks. Not only has the scheme, by which we should have mainly benefited, proved an

abortive one, but Mysore has been made to pay for it. Again, looking only at the annually accruing surpluses it would seem that we were a little too careless in sanctioning a costly form of Government. It is very easy to raise the pay of an establishment, but very difficult when hard times come to reduce it. One reform which we introduced, and which has been found to answer very well in our own territory is of questionable benefit in Mysore, and certainly costs a great deal of money. I refer to the payment of village servants in money instead of land. The result has been, at all events as far as Mysore is concerned, that in a great many cases the land which would otherwise have been cultivated is left waste, whilst the salaries have to be paid from the revenue accruing from other cultivated land. It is a strange thing that both in Hyderabad and in Mysore there is a strong feeling against the wisdom of the policy of paying village servants in money, and in the Dewan's annual speech the year before last he stated that it was under contemplation to return to the former state of things. Another system which in the interests of the Province we should have abolished is the *Amrat Mahal*. The Amrat Mahal cattle are a special breed maintained

originally by Hyder and Tippoo for transport of their war material. Upwards of half a million of acres are set apart for the maintenance of these herds, and in many villages the very best land is reserved as their grazing ground. As far as State service is concerned, Mysore has no longer any need of large transport trains, but the herds are very useful for recruiting our own baggage animals. For some years the Amrat Mahal cattle belonged entirely to our Government, but on the transfer of the Province to the present Maharajah they were sold back again for a large sum of money, the last instalment of one lakh of Rupees having only been repaid during the year 1884. The actual revenue under this head from sale of cattle, only just covers the expenditure, and the large amount of good land reserved for grazing ground represents therefore a dead loss to the State. In 1872 and the following years, we therefore see a revenue drawn almost entirely from agriculture and derived from an imperfectly developed country, with an expenditure yearly increasing, devoted to an establishment modelled on that of the infinitely better developed provinces of British territory. This state of things was not calculated to stand a severe strain or test. The test came in the

shape of famine, and then the whole fabric broke down. The famine of 1876-77-78 was more severely felt by Mysore than by any other Province in India, because it prevailed over almost the whole extent of the country. In Madras, whilst the north was struggling in the throes of famine, in the south there was nothing but high prices; and it was the same with Bombay and Hyderabad. What was lost in one place was regained in another. In Mysore it was not so. In almost every taluq there was scarcity and want, and there was no railway and few roads to bring the grain to the starving people. In addition to this came divided and wavering counsels. What was the result? Not only was the whole of the cash balance, which had risen to above 80 lakhs, swept away, but a debt of 80 more was incurred, and in spite of this the people died in hundreds of thousands. In no other Province was the mortality so great. It was equalled in a few taluqs of certain districts in British territory; but nowhere else was it so generally high. The word decimated is generally used to apply to great national catastrophes, and even in great wars, where modern inventions have rendered the slaughter on both sides so easy, the word is fairly correct. But as regards the loss of life

in Mysore during that one fatal year 1877 the word fails to convey a proper representation of what took place. Not one-tenth but one-fourth of the population was swept away. Previous to the famine there had been five millions of people; whilst it prevailed 1,250,000 died, and now, seven years after it has passed away, there are still in round numbers only four millions. Not only have the bread winners been swept away, but the repopulation has been checked. What wonder then that the revenue at once fell? Lands were thrown up because there was no one to cultivate them, and it has taken the country a longer time to recover from two years of famine and mismanagement than it did to recover from the fifty years of war during the last century.

But, though the revenue has fallen it has been found difficult to bring back the establishments to their former more modest limits, and the consequence has been that, after meeting the interest due on her debt, Mysore, for nine years, has only just been able to make ends meet, and even this could not have been done without a great deal of cheese-paring under which the pay of the officers, and especially of the subordinate grades, has been cut down to a limit too low to be safe. When the Maharajah

came of age the increased subsidy should have been levied, but as it is useless to expect blood from a stone, and as there was no money available, the payment was deferred for five years, until such time as the country had recovered from the effects of the famine. In 1885 the first payment should have been made but the evil day has again been deferred, and let us hope will not arrive until Mysore has reached the *status quo ante*, when she again has five millions of inhabitants, a revenue of 110 lakhs, and a growing cash balance. Then, and then only she can be said to have recovered from the effects of the famine.

But what likelihood is there of such a time arriving ? In 1885 the total revenue from all sources amounted to Rs. 1,00,70,975 being 2½ lakhs less than that of the previous year, and the expenditure amounted to Rs. 99,53, 596,leaving a balance of only a little more than one lakh of Rupees. In spite of all attempts at economy, the total expenditure was only Rs. 16,000 less than in the previous year, thus showing clearly that although the income may fall it is not possible to reduce the outgoings. It is not always possible for a State to cut its coat according to its cloth. This is scarcely the place in which to discuss in detail the heads

and figures of a budget, but if any one cares to go through the different items of revenue he will find that the incidence per head of the population is at present as high as the average of the rest of India, and in some cases above the average. In ordinary years about 70 per cent. of the revenue is derived from the land (last year it was 67 per cent.). Every country which depends so largely upon its land revenue, must be liable to great fluctuations in revenue, and must allow a wide margin of balance in order to pay for the deficiencies which periodically occur. This at present Mysore is unable to do. She was on the verge of a famine last year, which if it had occurred might have created a deficit, to take a low estimate, of 25 lakhs. From a danger of this kind she is never free, and with so small a margin as she now has, how can she possibly meet such an expenditure without incurring more debt? In a scantily populated country like Mysore where so large a proportion of the revenue is derived from agriculture, it stands to reason that the revenue can only increase *pari passu* with the population. With so much land lying waste as at present, most men can cultivate as much as they desire, and the land is waste not because it is unproductive, but because there is no one to cultivate

it. The increase of the land revenue will therefore in all probability be very gradual, since many years must pass before the population can stand at the same figure as it did before the famine. How then can a surplus be made? The establishments cannot well be cut down lower than they are now, for already many are nearly starved. In a few years the survey will have ceased operations, and then about 3½ lakhs will fall in, but this is not enough to meet the increased subsidy and also to provide a surplus. The only item which can and should be cut down is that of the military. Mysore owns a small army of military and cavalry numbering about 3,000 men, which cost annually 7½ lakhs of Rupees, the maintenance of which formed one of the articles of the treaty of 1799. As a military force they are of course entirely useless, though they perform useful service as treasury guards. This, however, could be far better done by Police and at less than half the cost. But, if they are not very useful they are ornamental, and come in well for purposes of state and show. Now this may be all very well, and it is no doubt a prejudice amongst native princes to possess armies of their own. From this point of view an army, however, is nothing more than a luxury, and a State has no more

right to indulge in luxuries when it cannot afford them than a private individual has. One enlightened Prince, the Maharajah of Cooch Behar, has already shown himself to be above this prejudice, and it is earnestly to be hoped that the Maharajah of Mysore will follow his example. If, like Cooch Behar, other native Princes would be content to accept a rank in our own army, a great step would be made towards the federalisation of the Indian Empire, for the interests and feelings would then be indentified with our own. Our own forces, stationed in their territories are in reality paid for by their money. They might easily be made available for purposes of State pageantry, and beyond this nothing is required.

Regarding the present Government of Mysore it is difficult now to pass an opinion. The present Dewan, Mr. Seshadri Iyer, has been but a short time (three years) in power, and he has had a very difficult and anxious time to go through. In Mysore as elsewhere there are parties and cliques, and Mr. Seshadri Iyer as a Madras Brahmin is naturally not viewed with the most favourable eyes by the Mysore Brahmins. Hitherto he may be congratulated upon what he has done, and he seems to be thoroughly in earnest in his wish to make himself a

name as an able and honest Minister. He is to a certain extent upon his trial, and with him the whole question of Native *versus* English administration. Enough has been said to show that he is not responsible for the present critical state of the Province, and it would be unfair to expect rapid results, for there is not in the country the same recuperative power that there is in Hyderabad. His work lies in the future, and success can only be attained by steady perseverance. In one respect perhaps it would be well to hear that there was a change and that the Maharajah kept up the old native tradition of accessibility to his people. The tour lately taken by His Highness was a step in the right direction, but it is to be trusted that these will not be allowed to degenerate into mere pleasure pic-nics, but will be made the occasions for the Ruler of the State to come into personal contact with his people and his servants. The representative assembly, inaugurated by the late Dewan, is also an institution to be commended, if care is taken to preserve its representative character. At present it seems to be constituted chiefly of officials who may be fair representatives of the governing class, but can scarcely be said to be so of the people. No doubt it does not do to go for-

ward too quickly, as Aurungzebe wrote to his son Kám Baksh, it does not do to let your feet be seen below your robe—but it does not do to fold one's hands and remain quiet. A real representative assembly in India will be an institution unprecedented in its history and may be the nucleus of great things to come. The assembly in Mysore may perhaps some day become a representative one, but it is not so now. This, and such other matters, may, however, be safely left to the Dewan. He is a strong man, and is ambitious of earning the reputation of a statesman. Under his control the machinery of State moves smoothly along, and with free hands and a less embarrassed exchequer, we may fairly hope that he will lose no opportunity of introducing such reforms as may be needed. In his personal life the Maharajah does credit to the careful training which he received. He is simple in his habits, domestic in his character, by no means inclined to extravagance, the husband of one wife, and manly in his tastes and amusements. He has a fine Province to rule over, and should it be his good fortune to bring it again to a state of prosperity, he will do much to establish the fact that in good hands native government can compare well with English administration.